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Abstract 
Extending the theories of employee incentives and inalienability of human capital, we investigate the link 
between a firm’s engagement in employee issues and the returns to shareholders around mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) and analyze an international sample of 4,565 M&A deals from 48 countries. We find that 
stronger employee-engagement—especially in terms of monetary benefits—by the acquiring firm is positively 
related to shareholder returns in domestic deals, but this positive effect is attenuated in cross-border deals, 
whereas workforce diversity, training and development, or health and safety do not affect shareholder value. 
The attenuating effect of cross-border deals is stronger when uncertainty about post-merger labor integration 
is higher and when economic nationalism in the target’s country is stronger, consistent with an explanation 
based on the inalienability of human capital and employment policies. Moreover, we find that most effects of 
employee-engagement on shareholder returns are driven by the acquirer rather than the target, and that they 
persist in the long run post-merger. 
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I. Introduction 
Corporations represent a nexus of implicit and explicit contracts between shareholders and stakeholders 
(Coase, 1937; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Summers, 1988). An important stakeholder group that is 
crucial to firms’ operations and performance consists of the employees, representing a firm’s human capital. 
Employees are involved in the firm’s daily operations and have a contractual claim on the company in the 
form of salaries (and bonuses). Moreover, they can directly and indirectly influence corporate decision making 
and governance through workers’ and unions’ rights to appoint members to the board of directors (Gorton 
and Schmid, 2004), works councils, employees’ ownership of company shares via participation in employee 
stock ownership plans, retirement accounts, and personal accounts (Kim, 2009), or through collective actions 
such as strikes and political lobbying. That labor’s bargaining power affects corporate decision making, 
corporate governance, and hence firm value has been established both theoretically and empirically in recent 
studies (e.g., Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos, 2009; Atanassov 
and Kim, 2009; Bae, Kang, and Wang, 2011).  
However, the extant literature offers mixed evidence on the direction and mechanisms through which 
firms’ employee-engagement—policies and practices that aim to provide better welfare (e.g., higher 
compensation and job security, more training and career advancement, the improvement of workforce health 
and safety, enhancement of workforce diversity) for employees—affects firm value. Some find a negative 
relation between shareholder value and labor orientation, explaining this relation by (too strong a) legal 
protection of workers (e.g., Gorton and Schmid, 2004; Dessaint, Golubov, and Volpin, 2016; Levine, Lin, and 
Shen, 2015) and manager-employee alliances (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009; Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie, 2016). This line of research argues that labor’s interests do not always align with those of shareholders 
and that strong labor protection regulations constitute a cost to the firm. Others find a positive relation, 
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especially with regard to employee satisfaction (Edmans, 2011, 2012; Edmans, Li, and Zhang, 2015). The 
common argument is that a satisfied workforce increases labor productivity and thus firm value.  
In this paper, we revisit this important issue, aiming to reconcile the conflicting findings in the extant 
literature and offer a more comprehensive evaluation on the role of labor orientation in corporate governance 
by focusing on a key issue in corporate finance, namely the inalienability of human capital (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Hart and Moore, 1994; Almazan, De Motta, and Titman, 2007; Bolton, Wang, and Yang, 2015), 
especially for rank-and-file employees. “Inalienability” stands for the fact that, in important contracting and 
transactional situations such as an acquisition, a buyer of a firm cannot change the human capital employed 
at a target company without frictions nor can it change the contracts that a target firm has voluntarily—in the 
sense of going beyond incumbent regulation—adopted.2 In addition, the target’s employees may also be less 
receptive to the labor policies implemented in the acquiring firm. Furthermore, whereas both human capital 
and explicit contracts are inalienable, it may also be difficult and even counter-productive if the acquirer were 
to break implicit contracts between the target’s employees and their management. (Implicit) contracts may 
depend on culture and norms, the social climate (driven by major social partners such as unions and 
employers), labor regulation, and the importance of corporate social responsibility, etc. Consequently, a 
transfer of the acquirer’s employment policy to the target may not be straightforward nor, even if this were 
possible, would it be expected to have the same impact as in the acquirer. We term this friction in transferring 
employee-related policies, stemming from the inalienability of employees’ human capital, as “the inalienability 
of employment policies.” In addition, we argue that frictions due to such inalienability may be less severe in a 
domestic takeover transaction because employees within a country may share similar values, cultures, and 
                                                          
2 For example, a sale of a firm triggers the “transfer of undertakings protection of employment” (TUPE) regulations of 1981, which 
stems from the European Acquired Rights directive. This regulation states that “all the [seller’s] rights, powers, duties and liabilities 
under or in connection with [an employee’s contract of employment], shall be transferred to the [buyer].” Furthermore, the buyer 
assumes the liability for “anything done before the transfer is completed by or in relation to the [seller] in respect of that contract 
or a person employed in that undertaking or part” (Calcagno and Renneboog, 2007). TUPE states that such an act “shall be deemed 
to have been done by or in relation to the [buyer].” 
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expectations which reduce the uncertainty about whether the labor policy of the acquirer will be successful 
after the merger.  
We first contrast several major theories on labor in corporate finance. Human relations theories (e.g., 
Maslow, 1943; Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959; McGregor, 1960) take a positive view on labor, 
arguing that labor is a key organizational asset and that stronger employee incentives increase productivity. 
The incentive effect of a firm’s orientation towards labor can thus create substantial value for shareholders 
(Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2015). Agency-based theories take a negative view, and argue that the 
employees’ objective function does not necessarily align with shareholder’s interests. Protecting employees’ 
interests increases the costs of their removal and can result in labor entrenchment, reducing operating 
efficiencies. Moreover, managers can protect themselves from being removed by hostile raiders through 
allying with labor and providing stronger employment protection, usually at the cost of shareholders (Pagano 
and Volpin, 2005; Cronqvist et al., 2009). In this context, a firm’s focus on its relations with employees is thus 
a deviation from value maximization. We take a third (and probably a more equilibrated and mixed) view, 
which hinges on the inalienability of human capital and employment policies. We argue that the benefits and 
costs of corporate employee-engagement depend on the extent to which the roles of employees are 
transferable across firms, which implies that the ultimate effect may depend on their relative strength and the 
contracting environment. A firm’s engagement in, for example, employment and wage insurance may function 
as an incentive tool to increase labor productivity and firm value when there are few uncertainties concerning 
the firm’s contracting environment. However, such engagement could potentially also turn into a burden for 
the firm by exposing the firm to greater uncertainties with regard to the implementation of its employment 
policies, thus reducing firm value.  
We organize our analysis around a particular type of corporate event in the firm’s lifecycle, namely 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which provide an ideal setting to study the inalienability of human capital 
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and the transferability of a firm’s employment policies to another firm, as they force firms to restructure their 
workforce. In a neoclassical framework, M&As are regarded as a means to enhance firms’ capabilities and 
resources (good M&As) or reflect managerial empire building behavior and other agency problems resulting 
in value-destruction (bad M&As) (Ahern and Weston, 2007). During this process, a firm’s commitment to 
explicit and implicit contracts with key stakeholders such as employees plays an important role in the wealth 
gains and losses of an acquirer’s shareholders (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 
2008; Masulis et al., 2016). In addition, labor reallocation both within and across industries and countries is a 
crucial factor in post-merger corporate restructuring (Dessaint et al., 2016). The global scope of the M&A 
market enables us to compare the role of a firm’s employee-engagement in driving shareholder value in a 
domestic setting and in a contractually and operationally more complex cross-border setting. This way, we 
can shed some light on how the contracting and operating environment interacts with the inalienability of 
human capital and employment policies in affecting employee-shareholder relations and ultimately firm value.  
Analyzing a sample of 2,009 acquiring firms from 48 countries engaging in 4,565 M&A deals, we find 
that there is considerable cross-firm and cross-country variation in firm-level employee-engagement that is 
priced by the market around corporate takeover events. The effects of employee engagement—especially 
those related to compensation and job security, but not those about training, diversity, and health and safety—
on acquirers’ announcement returns are significantly positive for firms conducting domestic deals, but they 
are significantly attenuated in cross-border deals. This finding holds even after controlling for differences in 
country-level labor regulations and other macroeconomic factors. The attenuating effect of acquiring a foreign 
target does not stem from the fact that cross-border deals on average destroy value as these deals have higher 
announcement returns than domestic acquisitions, but rather appears to be specific to a firm’s relation with 
its employees (the inalienability of human capital and employment policies, as we argue). These results 
reconcile the conflicting findings in the literature on the association between labor relations and 
announcement returns (Deng et al., 2013; Dessaint et al., 2016; Levine et al., 2015). We further investigate 
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several mechanisms related to employee incentives and inalienability of employment policies that may account 
for the difference in the effect of employee-engagement on shareholder returns around domestic and cross-
border M&A deals. In particular, we find that stronger “motivational factors” such as more pecuniary 
incentives and better monetary compensation are associated with higher acquirer announcement returns in 
domestic deals, but lower returns in cross-border deals, but this is not the case for “job security factors” such 
as employment retention and trade union relations. In addition, the negative employee-return relation in cross-
border deals is stronger when uncertainty with regard to post-merger labor integration is higher and when 
economic nationalism in the target country is potentially stronger. We also find that most effects of employee-
engagement come from acquirers rather than targets. We rule out several alternative explanations based on 
country-level labor regulations, cultures, common language, degree of economic development, and the 
potential backfiring effect of over-engaging in employees. Overall, our results suggest that part of the value 
composition in M&As comes from increasing productivity that is not purely operational but partially stems 
from a firm’s human capital, although the increase can be offset by the inherent inalienability of human capital 
and employment policies in cross-border acquisitions. 
While some recent studies look at labor relations in the context of corporate restructuring and takeovers 
(Atanassov and Kim, 2009; Masulis et al., 2016; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazava, 2015; Dessaint et al., 2016; 
Levine et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015; Lin, Schmid, and Xuan, 2017; Ahmad and Lambert, 2016), most research 
exclusively focuses on employment protection and labor regulations at the country level, investigating, for 
example, the level and rigidity of unionization and regulated labor representations, rather than the firm’s 
voluntary initiatives. Our study focuses on the firm’s voluntary engagement in its relations with employees 
and dissects corporate employee orientation into its different dimensions, capturing both employee incentives 
and employment protection. We also compare the differential roles of labor in domestic and cross-border 
takeover deals, and investigate how employee-engagement interacts with the institutional environment. To 
our knowledge, we are among the first to provide global firm-level evidence on the role of employees in 
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shaping corporate governance and firm value. In this regard, our study is also related to the emerging literature 
on the effect of employee-engagement as well as the inalienability of human capital on corporate policies (e.g., 
Bae et al., 2011; Hart and Moore, 1994; Bolton et al., 2015). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the literature on labor in corporate 
governance and M&As. Section III describes our data and methods, while Section IV presents the empirical 
results. Section V concludes.  
II. Corporate Employee-Engagement, Inalienability of Human Capital, and Takeovers 
Employees are arguably the most important stakeholders in modern corporations. They provide skills 
and human capital that contribute to the company’s core businesses and strengthen its competitiveness 
(Zingales, 2000; Schneper and Guillén, 2004; Pfeffer, 1998; Kang and Kim, 2015), but they also have claims 
on a significant share of the company’s profits. Traditional studies have identified two major mechanisms 
through which employees matter for firm value. On the one hand, the employee incentive view suggests that 
properly incentivizing employees can lead to increased productivity which translates into higher profitability 
(March and Simon, 1958; Edmans, 2011). In addition, employee representation on the corporate board can 
also transfer valuable operational knowledge to the decision-making process, improving the efficiency of 
board decisions (Fauver and Fuerst, 2006). This view is closely related to notion of implicit contracting with 
employees. That is, a firm’s engagement in establishing close labor relations can reflect its commitment to 
strong implicit contracts with employees (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). In the context of acquisitions, this 
decreases the likelihood of encountering difficulties when renegotiating employee contracts (Ahmad and 
Lambert, 2016), restructuring the workforce, attracting talented and motivated employees, lowering the 
transaction costs related to these contracts, and increasing labor productivity, all of which can lead to increased 
firm value. In addition, a (perceived) breach of trust by reneging on an (even implicit) contract or commitment 
may negatively affect employees’ performance (Robinson, 1996). From this employee incentives perspective, 
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shareholders’ and employees’ interests are aligned: satisfied employees are more loyal and productive and 
hence create more shareholder value, an effect that could be especially strong during a firm’s restructuring 
and expansion.  
On the other hand, the labor entrenchment view argues that employees and shareholders usually have 
conflicting interests, and a firm’s over-engagement in its employees may result in their entrenchment, 
constituting a cost for shareholders (Atanassov & Kim, 2009). In addition, management may ally with 
employees by providing generous employment benefits (for example in the form of employee stock ownership 
plans) in order to extract private benefits and fend off disciplinary takeover threats (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; 
Cronqvist et al., 2009). Under this more negative view, a firm’s engagement in employee relations may come 
as a significant cost for shareholders and lead to management-labor collusion, reducing returns to shareholders 
and increasing the likelihood of value-destroying M&As (Masulis et al., 2016). 
Some recent work also explores the risk and insurance aspects of employee relations, suggesting that 
labor incentives such as minimum wage and employment insurance provide a risk-sharing mechanism for 
employees within firms (Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi, 2005; Belo, Lin, and Bazdresch, 2014; Ellul, Pagano, 
and Schivardi, 2014; Kim, Maug, and Schneider, 2015; Favilukis and Lin, 2016). This mechanism however 
depends on the extent to which the firm commits to honor its promises to insure employees against adverse 
shocks and on employees’ valuation of such insurance (Ellul et al., 2014).  
In this paper, we provide an alternative view on the role of employees based on the inalienability of 
human capital and employment policies for rank-and-file workers, which could reconcile the conflicting 
findings in the extant literature. In general, strong employee-engagement serves as a signal to shareholders 
about the firm’s reputation for committing and honoring implicit contracts with its labor force: it signals that 
the firm is unlikely to break such contracts in case of an event, of which an M&A deal is a prime example, 
that pressurizes the relations with the employees. This increases labor’s productivity and commitment to the 
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firm, leads to higher firm value, and is consistent with the employee incentive view. However, the inalienability 
of human capital and employment policies can also reduce the productivity gains from incentivizing employees, 
and the net effect depends on uncertainties in the contracting and operational environment. For example, 
renegotiating contracts with employees becomes more complicated and costly when a firm conducts 
acquisitions which entail a reallocation of its workforce in more uncertain environments. Managers also tend 
to “over-engage” in employees during an aggressive expansion period so as to achieve greater economies of 
scale, usually resulting in clashes between organizational cultures between merging firms (Aguilera, Dencker, 
and Yalabik, 2008). Moreover, a corporate policy of stronger employee-engagement under the uncertainty 
induced by an acquisition can lead to concerns by the acquiring firm’s employees about partial transfers of 
their benefits to target employees, which could thus temper the morale of the employees of the acquirer. 
Consequently, conflicts of interest between shareholders and employees could also arise due to inability to 
adapt employment contracts and policies to changing market conditions, which then ultimately reduce the 
value accruing to shareholders. Recent empirical evidence indeed suggests that more rigid labor contracts 
resulting from stricter labor protection laws limit the extent to which firms can eliminate redundancies in the 
workforce and achieve the targeted economies of scale (John et al., 2015; Levine et al., 2015; Dessaint et al., 
2016).  
A natural classification of takeover transactions in terms of the degree of uncertainty about how easily 
the human capital and employment policies of the two firms can be integrated is whether the deal is conducted 
domestically or across national borders. In particular, cross-border M&A deals are often associated with 
greater complexity in dealing with employee issues put up by frictions related to national boundaries. These 
frictions comprise difficulties in (re)negotiating employee contracts and compensation with the target’s 
employees, in navigating through the culturally and regulatory diverse employment environments, and in 
transplanting a specific employment policy to other parts of the combined organization. For instance, 
employees and shareholders in the acquiring firm, while enjoying the benefits of greater economies of scale 
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achieved through cross-border acquisition, may also be concerned that the same (or greater) level of employee-
engagement constitutes higher costs due to difficulties of integrating their workforce and employment policies. 
We argue that frictions stemming from the inalienability of human capital of rank-and-file workers can 
potentially attenuate the positive effect of incentivizing employees on firm value, and this can turn strong 
employee-engagement into a burden for the firm. Which specific employee-related factors are more dominant 
in the above described relations is subject to our empirical investigation.  
In the next section, we empirically test these predictions and mechanisms on a large international sample. 
III. Data and Methodology 
III.1. Data 
We measure a firm’s employee-engagement using data from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. This 
firm-level database provides information and ratings on firms’ practice on social, corporate governance, 
economic, and environmental issues (“pillars”) and covers more than 4,000 companies worldwide since 2002. 
Our main focus is on the variables related to the firm’s workforce under the “social” pillar, which describe its 
commitment and effectiveness with regard to the provision of (i) employment quality in terms of high-quality 
employment benefits and job security (Employment Quality), (ii) a healthy and safe workplace (Health & Safety), 
(iii) on-the-job training and development for employees (Training & Development), and (iv) equal opportunities 
within its workforce (Workforce Diversity). Each of these employee-related dimensions is an equally-weighted 
average of a set of underlying elements (sub-dimensional factors). For example, Employment Quality consists of 
measures of the firm’s salary level, wage distribution, trade union relations, bonus plans, fringe benefits, 
employment awards, employment creation, personnel turnover, lay-offs, management departures, strikes, job 
security policies, and employment controversies in the media. This way we can test the importance of the 
above four employee-related dimensions but also go one level deeper within each sub-dimension and test the 
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monetary incentive effects as well as employee insurance effects (such as job security) on shareholder returns 
around M&A announcements.  
The four employee-engagement measures as well as their respective sub-dimensional scores are 
normalized by ASSET4 such that each firm is given a z-score relative to the performance of all firms in the 
same industry. The normalization to a scale of 100 implies that, by construction, firms with scores higher than 
50 perform above the median in terms of employee-engagement. These measures enable us to assess a firm’s 
orientation towards employee issues relative to the industry benchmark, and provide us with a natural yardstick 
to gauge whether the firm excessively engages in employee relations. This way, we can compare corporate 
employee-engagement across firms with similar demand for labor skills and operating in similar labor markets, 
and also disentangle explanations based on over-engagement versus inalienability of employment policies.  
We obtain data on M&A deals from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. In order to be included 
in our sample, the transactions should meet the following criteria: (1) the deal was announced between January 
1st, 2002 and December 31st, 2014 and the SDC database contains detailed information on this transaction;3 
(2) the acquiring firm is publicly listed and its accounting and stock return data are available in Datastream; 
(3) the acquiring firm owns less than 50% of the target’s shares before the offer and makes an offer with the 
intention to own more than 50% of the target’s shares subsequent to a successful acquisition; (4) the acquiring 
firm has data available in ASSET4 for the fiscal year before the deal announcement; and (5) labor protection 
data for both the acquirer’s and target’s countries are available in the Botero et al. (2004) labor regulation 
indices. 
Merging the information from ASSET4 with our sample of M&A deals from SDC results in a final 
sample of 4,565 deals by 2,009 acquiring firms from 48 countries. Of these deals, 2,550 (56%) are domestic 
and 2,015 (44%) are cross-border. The descriptions of our key variables are given in Appendix A. Appendix 
                                                          
3 It is not meaningful to include the deals announced before 2002 as the ASSET4 coverage starts in 2002. 
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B shows the sample distribution by acquirer industry and year. The acquiring firms in our sample are mostly 
active in Business Services (10%), Trading (8%), and Banking (7%) industries4. Appendix C shows the sample 
distribution by acquirer country. Acquiring firms originate mainly from the US (27%), Japan (15%), and the 
UK (13%). In addition, Appendices D1 and D2 respectively offer an overview of our employee-engagement 
scores by country and industry. 
III.2. Empirical Strategy 
To assess shareholders’ reactions to M&A announcements and thus draw some inferences on 
shareholder value, we calculate cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) of the acquiring firm in the three 
days surrounding the deal announcement [-1,+1], where abnormal returns are defined as the difference 
between the firm’s actual and expected returns. These expected returns are obtained from the market model 
estimated over a period starting 100 days before the announcement date until 30 days before this date: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
∝𝑖+ 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return for firm i on day t, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return on the primary 
stock market of the country in which the firm’s headquarter is located. The estimated coefficients enable us 
to calculate the returns expected for the case without a takeover offer. We then calculate the CARs by 
summing of the abnormal returns in the three days around the announcement date. We necessarily focus on 
the acquiring firms’ CARs because studying the combined CARs of both acquirers and the targets makes us 
lose more than 80% of our sample (as the number of public target firms is limited). Similarly, we confine our 
analysis to the acquiring firms’ employee relations, as the availability of data for firm-level employee-
engagement and stock information for target firms is also very limited (less than 10% of the sample). Our 
core specification is: 
                                                          
4 To keep a sufficiently large number of observations, we do not exclude the financials and utilities industries. However, our 
conclusions remain unaffected after excluding these from the sample (results are available on request). 
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𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝐴𝑅 [−1, +1]𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
′ 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3
′ 𝐿𝑎𝑏. 𝑅𝑒𝑔. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑐 + 𝛽4
′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 
where Employee Engagement.j,t-1 measures the acquiring firm’s engagement in employee-related issues 
(including Employment Quality, Health & Safety, Workforce Diversity, and Training & Development) for the fiscal year 
prior to the deal announcement, and Xij indicates a set of standard deal- and firm-level control variables 
including acquirer ROA, acquirer leverage, acquirer size, a serial acquirer dummy, relative deal size, and 
dummies for toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public 
targets. Lab. Reg. Indexc is a set of four (target and/or acquirer) country-level labor regulation indices from 
Botero et al. (2004), which have been widely used in studies on the role of labor protection (e.g. Atanassov 
and Kim, 2009; Levine et al., 2015). These indices consist of (1) an employment laws index, which measures 
the protection of labor and employment contracts; (2) a collective relations laws index, which measures the 
statutory protection and power of labor unions as well as protection of workers during collective disputes; (3) 
a social security laws index, which measures social security benefits related to old age, disability, death, sickness, 
and unemployment; and (4) a civil rights index, which captures the degree of statutory protection of vulnerable 
groups against employment discrimination. As our goal is to examine the role of firm-level employee-
engagement, it is important to control for these country-level labor regulation variables so as to disentangle 
the firm-level effects of (voluntary) labor-orientation from the effects resulting from country-level (mandatory) 
labor protection regulations. Finally, γ is a set of year, acquirer- and target-industry fixed effects that we include 
to further reduce concerns related to a potential omitted variable bias in the relationship between corporate 
employee-engagement and stock returns around M&A announcements.  
In addition, we explore the potential mechanisms that account for the differential relations between 
employee-engagement and shareholder returns in domestic and cross-border deals by considering a set of 
sub-dimensional factors of our main employee-engagement scores (e.g. monetary incentives such as bonus 
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plans, fringe benefits, the wage ratio of employees/CEO, trade union relations policies, employment 
growth/loss, job security policies, etc.). We also interact these employee-engagement measures with country- 
and firm-level variables that capture the uncertainties in the integration of human capital and the consistency 
of employment policies. Definitions of all variables are available in Appendix A.  
IV. Results 
IV.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A in Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our main measures of firm-level employee-
engagement for the acquiring firms in domestic and cross-border deals, respectively. Our main explanatory 
variables on a firm’s employee-engagement are Workforce Diversity, Employment Quality, Health and Safety, and 
Training and Development, which are measured in terms of industry-adjusted normalized scores (ranging from 0 
to 100) and indicate a firm’s engagement relative to its industry peers. In domestic deals, these employment 
policy variables are close to the sample mean (of 50), whereas in cross-border deals, they are significantly 
higher than the sample mean and median. Each of these employee policy scores are statistically significantly 
higher (8 to 13 points on a scale of 100) for firms engaging in cross-border deals relative to those involved in 
domestic transactions (Table 1, Panel A). The other variables shown in Panel A represent a set of sub-
dimensional factors used to construct the Employment Quality score (see Appendix A for variable descriptions); 
in domestic deals, an average of 39% of the acquiring firms offer a bonus plan to their employees, 43% provide 
fringe benefits such as pension funds or health insurance, the average acquirer increased its workforce by 3.5% 
in the year prior to the acquisition, 18% of the acquiring firms has a policy in place for maintaining good 
relations with trade unions, and 6% of firms have policy to enhance job security. In contrast, acquirers 
engaging in cross-border deals are more likely to offer a bonus plan to their employees (48%), are more likely 
to have a policy for maintaining good relations with trade unions (32%), and are more likely to have a job 
security policy in place (11%). Overall, these results suggest that firms conducting cross-border acquisitions 
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are different from those conducting domestic acquisitions in terms of their relations with employees, and also 
appear to have above-average employee-engagement. 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics for deal-level characteristics, starting with the acquirer’s CARs over 
the window [-1, 1]. Consistent with findings in the literature, acquirer shareholders in domestic deals do not 
gain from M&A deals: the mean and median CARs are -25 and -22 basis points, respectively. About 41% of 
our sample consists of cross-border deals, and in these deals acquirer shareholders earn positive mean and 
median returns of 16 and 3 basis points, respectively. Although shareholders of acquirers conducting cross-
border deals earn more positive returns on average, the median return is close to zero. Cross-border acquirers 
are less likely to acquire public targets, make all-cash offers, and acquire toehold stakes. Cross-border deal 
values tend to be comparable to domestic deal values (16% of the acquirer’s market capitalization in cross-
border deals and 17% in domestic deals). The firm-level variables in Panel C show that firms acquiring 
domestically are comparable to firms acquiring cross-border targets in terms of leverage and profitability (as, 
although the difference in means is statistically significant, it is economically small), but are smaller in size and 
are less likely to be serial acquirers5. Panels D and E compare the acquirer’s and target’s country-level labor 
protection indices: acquiring firms in domestic deals tend to be located in countries with slightly lower 
protection in terms of employment, collective relations, and social security, but with stronger civil rights than 
acquiring firms in cross-border deals. Also, targets in cross-border deals have a higher employment laws index 
than acquirers in domestic deals. 
[ Insert Table 1 about here ] 
We can derive some interesting insights from our descriptive statistics: compared to acquirers in domestic 
deals, those engaging in cross-border deals have on average more generous employment policies at the firm-
                                                          
5 A serial acquiring firm is defined as a firm engaging in more than 10 takeover deals across our sample period. Alternatively, when 
we define serial acquirers as firms engaging in more than two takeover deals per year, our conclusions are not affected. A relatively 
large number of deals– they make up 25% of our sample – involve serial acquiring firms. 
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level, and their deals also earn higher announcement returns compared to domestic acquirers.  However, they 
also differ in a number of deal-, firm-, and country-level characteristics. It is thus not clear whether the higher 
announcement returns in cross-border deals are causally related to stronger employee-engagement, which as 
we will show below, is in fact not likely the case.   
We also show similar descriptive statistics for target firms, but only for the small subsample for which 
employee-engagement data are available, as ASSET4 mostly covers large firms included in the major global 
equity indices. Again, target firms’ employee-engagement scores are higher for cross-border deals than for 
domestic deals. Consistent with the M&A literature, target firms also enjoy positive announcement CARs, 
which are higher for cross-border deals. Targets are smaller in size compared to acquirers, but they are more 
profitable. The relative deal size is much larger in this small subsample compared to the full sample in Table 
1, which is of course due to ASSET4 only covering large publicly-listed firms. Overall, the descriptive statistics 
in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that there are substantial differences in employee-engagement and firm 
characteristics between acquirers and targets, and between domestic deals and cross-border deals. 
[ Insert Table 2 about here ] 
IV.2. Employee-Engagement and Shareholder Returns in Domestic and Cross-Border Takeovers 
We now formally test the relations between firm-level employee-engagement and acquirer returns. As 
we argue above, a firm’s engagement towards its employees’ welfare can increase employee productivity and 
support, leading to higher shareholder value, partially reflected in higher stock returns at the firm’s acquisition 
announcement. However, such a positive incentive effect can be attenuated if the acquisition takes place 
across national borders, due to the inalienability of human capital and the resulting uncertainties regarding the 
transfer of employment policies. We test this hypothesis in Table 3, where we interact a cross-border deal 
dummy with the firm’s employee-engagement scores, respectively, while including the firm- and deal-level 
controls specified in Section II (acquirer ROA, leverage, size, a serial acquirer indicator, relative deal size, and 
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dummies for toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public 
targets), acquirer and target country-level labor protection indices, and year, acquirer- and target-industry fixed 
effects. In Models (1)-(4) we regress acquirer announcement CARs on four different employee-engagement 
scores—Employment Quality, Health & Safety, Workforce Diversity, and Training & Development—separately and 
combine them in one model (Model (5)) to cross-validate our results. 
Several interesting observations emerge. First, an acquiring firm’s employee-engagement is positively 
related to shareholder returns, but only in terms of employment quality—which captures compensation and 
job security (Model (1))—and not in terms of issues related to health and safety (Model (2)), workforce 
diversity (Model (3)), and training and development (Model (4)). When all employee-engagement scores enter 
into Model (5), we obtain similar results. The fact that only Employment Quality is significantly related to 
shareholder returns is consistent with the notion that employees are more likely to be incentivized by benefits 
in terms of monetary compensation and job security, rather than by improvement of their working 
environment (Herzberg et al., 1959). Second, cross-border deals generally earn higher returns for acquirer 
shareholders, consistent with findings in the extant literature that usually attributes this effect to the benefits 
of international diversification and the value of control (e.g., Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Chari, Ouimet and 
Tesar, 2010). Third, the interaction between employee-engagement and the cross-border dummy is negative 
in all models, but it is only statistically significant when employee-engagement is measured by our Employment 
Quality score. That is, the positive effect of employment quality is attenuated when the deal is conducted across 
national borders. In other words, stronger employee-engagement in cross-border deals may reduce the returns 
to acquiring firms’ shareholders, a result further supported by our subsample analysis in which we conduct 
the same analysis for domestic and cross-border deals, separately (see Appendix E). This contrast is 
economically remarkable: a one standard deviation increase (+ 30) in the acquirer’s score on Employment Quality 
is associated with an increase of 0.20% (20 bps) in returns in domestic deals, but the increase in returns around 
cross-border deals drops from 1.18% to 0.78% (a 40 bps decrease) in Model (1) and even from 1.01% to 0.52% 
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(a 50 bps decrease) in Model (5). Combining these results, we can conclude that, despite the summary statistics 
in Table 1 indicating that cross-border acquirers have higher levels of employee-engagement and experience 
on average higher announcement returns, these higher returns are not likely to result from the acquirer’s 
stronger employee-engagement. Instead, they are consistent with the notion that acquiring across national 
borders reduces the potential gains for shareholders from their firm’s engagement in employee interests and 
may turn it into a burden for the firm, possibly due to difficulties in transferring (generous) employment 
policies. Among the (intangible) assets the bidding firm will acquire is the human capital of the target firm, 
which includes the (explicit) contracts between the target and its employees, the implicit contracts between 
the target and unions/employees, the target’s corporate culture etc. While the acquiring company ‘inherits’ 
the explicit employee contracts, it is ex ante unclear to what extent its own employment policies are congruent 
with the implicit contracts in the target firm, how responsive the target’s employees are to incentive 
mechanisms that work well in the acquiring firm, and to what extent job flexibility can be requested from 
target’s employees, etc. Overall, these results in Table 3 suggest that firm-level employment policies with 
regard to monetary incentives and job security are priced by the market around M&As. Firms with higher 
scores on Employment Quality earn higher abnormal returns when taking over domestic targets, but lower 
abnormal returns when taking over targets abroad.6 
It is important to note that we control in all specifications for labor regulations in the acquirer’s and—
in cross-border deals—also the target’s country. In line with Dessaint et al. (2016), we find that in domestic 
deals a country’s labor laws regarding employment regulation (which to a large extent measures the labor 
rigidity faced by a firm) are negatively related to announcement returns. However, the inclusion of country-
                                                          
6 Our results thus emerge from the fact that transferring and integrating employee policies is more easily done in domestic deals, 
which results in higher returns to acquirer shareholders. This however also raises the question as to why, if such employee policies 
raise shareholder value, the target did not introduce them before. One potential explanation is that the target may not have had the 
resources to do so. For a subsample of deals in which we have data on the target’s leverage, we do indeed find that targets in 
domestic deals with high-employment quality acquirers are more financially constrained, and that the positive effects of acquirer 
employee engagement in domestic deals are largely driven by deals in which the targets are more financially constrained (higher 
levered). 
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level labor regulation indices does not erode the significance of our firm-specific employment quality score. 
This suggests that government-imposed labor protection regulations are not perfect substitutes for voluntary 
employee incentives at the firm level. In addition, the signs and significance for our other control variables 
are comparable to those found in the literature (e.g. Lin, Officer, and Zou, 2011): acquiring a public target for 
example negatively affects the returns to shareholders, whereas most firm-level characteristics and the financial 
performance of acquirers do not seem to play a significant role in driving the acquirer’s own returns. In 
unreported tests, we additionally control for acquirer and target country-level measures of culture (proxied by 
indicators from the World Value Survey), for the acquirer’s and target’s country GDP and GDP per capita, 
as well as for the differences between the acquirer’s and target’s country cultural and economic attributes. 
None of these controls is consistently statistically significant and adding them does not affect the significance 
of our measures of employee-engagement.  
[ Insert Table 3 about Here ] 
IV.3. Employee-Engagement and Takeover Propensity 
Our above interpretations are largely based on the assumption that M&A decisions are exogenous to an 
acquiring firm’s own degree of employee-engagement, and thus to the desire to acquire human capital or 
restructure its workforce (Gao and Ma, 2016; Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2016). However, we still need to verify 
whether this is really the case for our sample: does a firm’s level of employee-engagement drive the returns 
around domestic and cross-border M&A deals through its effect on increasing/reducing the likelihood of 
engaging in a domestic versus a cross-border M&A? In Table 4, we use a Heckman selection model to estimate 
the relation between the firm’s four measures of employee-engagement and the likelihood of the firm 
embarking on a domestic versus a cross-border takeover transaction, conditional on the firm having decided 
on performing an M&A deal. Our results show that, although a firm’s employment policies are positively 
related to engaging in M&A deals in the first stage (consistent with Gao and Ma, 2016; Ouimet and Zarutskie, 
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2016), these results are economically trifling (ranging between 1 and 0.5 basis points) and the firm’s employee 
policies are not significantly related to the choice between domestic versus cross-border deals (2nd stage 
regressions). This implies that a firm’s engagement towards its employees is not likely to be a significant driver 
of management’s decision to engage in domestic versus cross-border M&A deals, but—as we will show in the 
previous section—it does affect shareholders’ perceived value creation around these deals. 
[ Insert Table 4 about here ] 
IV.4. Unbundling Employee Incentives 
Next, we further investigate the mechanisms underlying the above-documented employee-engagement 
effects. If the main effect of employee-engagement (particularly employment quality) does indeed capture an 
incentive effect as we hypothesized, we expect the positive employment quality effect on domestic takeovers 
and the attenuating effect of cross-border deals to mainly run through channels that are specific to enhancing 
employee incentives and increasing productivity. To test such channels, we dig deeper into the ASSET4 
measures of employee welfare by decomposing the Employment Quality score into two broad categories 
capturing employees’ monetary incentives (including fair salaries, bonus plans, and other fringe benefits) and 
job security incentives (including growth in the workforce, trade union relations, and the presence of a job 
security policy), respectively. This classification also conceptually matches the dichotomy by Herzberg et al. 
(1959) who distinguish between “motivational” factors (such as monetary incentives) and “maintenance” 
factors (such as job retention policies and improving working conditions). The former set of incentives, the 
monetary incentives, represent how much the firm values the specificity of human assets (Williamson, 1981), 
and thus can increase employee productivity and commitment by linking compensation to firm performance, 
providing a fair wage, attracting talented employees, and encouraging diligence. The latter set of incentives, 
that we refer to as “job security” factors, are directly related to employee loyalty and commitment and are thus 
more direct measures of the employment insurance dimension of employee relations. They represent the 
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collective governance of human assets which are not necessarily employee-specific, and may not directly 
translate into superior labor productivity (Williamson, 1981). As argued by Herzberg (1959; 1964; 1966), while 
monetary incentives are important determinants to productivity and firm performance, job security factors do 
not lead to superior performance, and may even constitute a significant cost for shareholders. Based on these 
arguments, we expect that stronger monetary incentives increase employee productivity and reduce resistance 
against takeovers, which is reflected in higher announcement returns. In addition, value-increasing monetary 
incentives in the acquiring firm may not have the desired effects in a cross-border deal, due to the inalienability 
of employment policies in the target firm. In contrast, stronger job security incentives do not directly 
incentivize employees to increase productivity and can result in employment rigidity, redundancies, and 
inability to benefit from economies of scale.  
In Panel A of Table 5, we consider three forms of monetary incentives: (i) the provision of a bonus plan 
(Acquirer Bonus Plan Dummy), (ii) the provision of fringe benefits such as pension funds and health insurance 
(Acquirer Fringe Benefits Dummy), and (iii) the wage ratio of the average worker’s salary and the CEO’s income 
(Acquirer Wage Ratio Employees/CEO).7 We include the latter based on the argument that a smaller wage gap is 
likely to increase employees’ perception of being paid a fair wage, which may further increase their productivity 
and reduce the likelihood of resisting takeovers. We also interact all these monetary incentive variables with 
the cross-border indicator. From the results in Panel A, we note that each of our monetary incentive indicators 
is positively related to acquirer announcement returns, supporting our incentive effect hypothesis. In addition, 
the positive effects are again attenuated by the cross-border dummy in the interaction term, in line with the 
results from Table 3. This can be still explained by the inalienability of employment policies with regard to 
monetary compensation, as employee compensation schemes differ significantly across countries (e.g., Card, 
Heining, and Kline, 2013; Mueller, Ouimet, and Simintzi, 2017) and an overly generous compensation policy 
                                                          
7 The effect of the firm’s industry is controlled for by including industry fixed effects in all models.  
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for all employees with different backgrounds and productivities could easily distort workforce incentives in 
general (Mueller et al., 2017), which is more likely to happen for cross-border deals. However, the afore-
documented effect of employee-engagement on acquirer CARs mostly come from monetary incentives, and 
not from the job security factors, presented in Panel B and measured by (i) whether or not the firm has a trade 
union relations policy (Acquirer Trade Union Relations Policy), (ii) employment growth (Acquirer Net Employment 
Creation), and (iii) whether the firm has a job security policy (Acquirer Job Security Policy). Overall, we find no 
significant association between the factors related to job security and the abnormal announcement returns. 
We also test a set of alternative variables related to job security (not reported): the percentage of trade 
unionization in the acquirer firm, the rate of turnover in the workforce, and the number of controversies 
regarding lay-offs or wages reported in the media. In general, these results are consistent with Herzberg’s 
conjecture, namely that job security does not lead to superior performance, and with our above arguments 
that motivational factors (in terms of monetary incentives) enhance firm performance through the channel of 
incentivizing employees to increase productivity, efficiency, and support around takeovers. Our results also 
echo those of Table 3: monetary incentives enhance firm value in domestic deals, but this effect is reduced in 
cross-border deals. The inalienability of human capital and employment policies creates uncertainties 
regarding the transfer of implicit contracts and the extent to which monetary incentives can increase 
employees’ productivity and efficiency in the foreign target firm. In addition, they are in line with our results 
in Table 3 showing that higher levels of workforce diversity, training, and health and safety are not significantly 
related to shareholder returns; these dimensions of employee relations are more closely related to the job 
security factors than to the monetary incentives and are less important drivers behind the employee-
engagement effect. Overall, the results in Table 5 further support the employee incentive channel that we 
hypothesized.  
[ Insert Table 5 about here ] 
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IV.5. Inalienability of Human Capital and Employment Policies in Cross-Border Takeovers 
While we have shown the role of incentive effects above, we now turn to investigating whether the 
attenuating effect of cross-border transactions is really driven by the inalienability of human capital and 
employment policies. In other words, since cross-border deals on average generate higher announcement 
returns, which implies that going cross-border in itself is not likely to explain the attenuating effect, what other 
(especially employee-specific) factors then account for the negative interaction effects shown in Table 3? 
Frictions such as geographical distance and cross-country differences in rules and regulations make the 
transaction environment in cross-border deals more complex than that in domestic ones. As we argued above, 
these frictions induce uncertainties about employee integration and consistency of employment policies of the 
merging firms, which exemplify the inalienability of employment policies. We therefore consider several 
mechanisms that potentially reduce these uncertainties about the transfer and integration of employment 
policies, and therefore diminish the negative effect of employee-engagement in cross-border deals that we 
established in Table 3. In particular, we focus on seven variables at both the firm-level, industry-level, and the 
country-level, and interact them with our Employment Quality score for the subsample of cross-border deals, as 
reported in Table 6. As before, we find for each of our proxies that the main effect of employee-engagement 
is significantly negative.8 The first variable captures whether or not the transaction is a repeat acquisition in 
the target country, as repeatedly acquiring firms in the same country familiarizes the acquirer with the target 
country’s employment cultures and labor market, which reduces the uncertainty about how to transfer and 
integrate its human capital policies. As shown in Model (1), while the coefficient on Employment Quality is 
negative, the interaction term “Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × Repeat Acquisition” is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, supporting the above argument. In economic terms, a 30 point increase in 
                                                          
8 This echoes our results in Table 3 and Appendix E on the effect of employee-engagement and a deal’s geographical focus on 
acquirer CARs. 
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Employment Quality (one standard deviation) increases CARs by 0.09% if the acquirer has acquisition experience 
in the target’s country, relative to a -0.33% decrease if this were not the case. 
The second variable is a target country’s remuneration culture regarding the importance of ‘good pay’, 
because when there is a similar attitude towards monetarily incentivizing employees in both the target and 
acquirer countries, it will be easier for the acquirer to implement in the target firm the same incentivizing 
policies that can effectively enhance employee productivity (which we have documented in Table 5). We 
obtain the data on the country-level “Importance of Good Pay” from the World Value Survey, and consider 
the case in which people in the target’s country have a higher predilection for good pay in their job relative to 
that in the acquirer’s country. This predilection could signal the potential effectiveness of introducing or 
maintaining monetary incentives for employees in the target firm to acquiring firms’ shareholders. The positive 
interaction of “Acquirer Employment Quality × (Target Country > Acq. Country ‘Good Pay is Important’)” in Model 
(2) supports this argument. In deals where the target’s country has a higher predilection for good pay, the 
negative effect of employment quality is weaker. 
The third variable captures the attitude towards saving in the target’s country. It indicates whether people 
in the target’s country attach more importance to saving money relative to people in the acquirer’s country. 
An acquiring firm may more easily transfer monetary incentive policies to countries where people think saving 
money is relatively important (or value the possession of money more). This is supported by the positive 
interaction of “Acquirer Employment Quality × (Target Country > Acq. Country ‘Saving is Important’)” in Model (3). 
A one standard deviation increase in Employment Quality increases CARs from -0.96% to -0.21% when 
acquiring a target firm in such a country.  
The fourth variable captures the absence of economic nationalism in the target country’s government as, 
in the inverse case, foreign acquirers can face more resistance from target countries’ governments who may 
fear that foreign acquirers will infringe national interests and that corporate restructuring will induce massive 
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lay-offs in the target firm, and who thus prefer that the target remains domestically owned. If such “economic 
nationalism” is low, foreign acquirers with better employee relations may face less political opposition such 
that transposing their employment policies to the target is likely to be more effective than in the case with 
stronger protectionist attitudes. We follow Dinc and Erel (2013) and use the ruling of a liberal government (a 
dummy variable indicating whether the ruling government is right-wing; data obtained from the Database of 
Political Institutions) in the target’s country to proxy for the absence of economic nationalism, as 
(rightwing-)liberal parties usually and traditionally favor more free trade (Dinc and Erel, 2013). This argument 
is supported by the positive coefficient on the interaction term “Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × (Absence of 
Economic Nationalism in Target Country)” in Model (4), which indicates that the absence of strong economic 
nationalism reduces the uncertainty with regard to employee policy integration. 
The fifth variable is the perceived strength of labor unions in the acquirer and target’s country. The 
rationale is that strong labor unions increase contract rigidity and difficulty in negotiating with employees. 
Therefore, low union strength in the target’s country (as perceived by the acquirer) indicates the relative ease 
with which acquirers can restructure the workforce and implement post-merger employment policies in line 
with those in the acquiring firm. Of course, if in the acquirer country there are strong labor unions, the 
employees of the acquiring firm may attempt to resist such implementation of favorable employment policies 
in the target firm as this may shift resources from the acquirer’s to the target’s employees. We therefore 
specifically consider the case in which both the acquirer and target countries’  have low perceived union 
strength (“low” is defined as being in the bottom tercile of the distribution), where perceived union strength 
is measured by “Confidence in Unions”, also from the World Value Survey. As shown in Model (5), the 
interaction term “Acquirer Employment Quality × (Acquirer and Target Country Low Union Strength)” has a positive 
loading, suggesting that the negative effect of employee-engagement in cross-border deal becomes less 
negative when both acquirer and target country have low perceived union strength. 
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In Model (6), we test whether the employee policies are more easily transferred and integrated in the case 
of low-tech deals (in which target and acquirer are both in low-tech industries), relative to deals in which at 
least one of the parties is in a high-tech industry. High-tech industries are fast-changing and more complex 
than traditional low-tech industries, especially in terms of incentivizing and motivating employees (Eyob, 
1994). We thus expect that transferring and integrating employee policies in a high-tech target is more difficult, 
as in such industries corporate culture or the reputation of the employer may be more important than purely 
monetary incentives (see e.g. Focke, Maug and Niessen-Runzi, 2016) reducing the returns to acquirer 
shareholders. In low-tech deals on the other hand, integration is done more easily, alleviating the negative 
effects of employee-engagement in cross-border deals that we have identified above. As shown in Model (6), 
“Acquirer Employment Quality × Low-Tech deal” is significantly positive, indicating that acquirer shareholders 
react more positively to cross-border deals by high-employment quality acquirers that engage in low-tech deals 
versus high-tech deals.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that when there are fewer uncertainties about the transfer and 
integration of human capital and employment policies, the relatively negative effect of employee-engagement 
(especially employment quality) in cross-border acquisitions becomes weaker and can be even completely off-
set. Combining this with the fact that cross-border deals usually achieve higher abnormal returns, our results 
point to the explanation that the negative interaction between employment quality and cross-border deals as 
found in Table 3 is not due to a deal being cross-border per se, but to a unique aspect of cross-border deals 
that is related to the inalienability of human capital and employment policies and the resulting uncertainties 
regarding the transfer and integration of such policies in a foreign target firm.  
[ Insert Table 6 about here ] 
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IV.6. The Role of Target Firm’s Employee-Engagement 
One could wonder whether our above results are driven by the target’s employee-engagement, which 
coincides with the acquirer’s employee-engagement. Empirically this is a difficult question because we do not 
have sufficient data on the targets’ employee-engagement in the ASSET4 database, as the database mainly 
covers large firms included in the major global equity indices and most (small) targets do not receive a rating 
from ASSET4. Nevertheless, we conduct tests on a subsample of deals with employee-engagement data 
available for both the target and the acquiring firm (362 deals in total). We classify both the acquirer’s and the 
target’s Employee Quality scores into high- and low-groups (“high” or “low” refers to the employee-engagement 
score being above or below the sample median). We then interact the cross-border dummy with different 
combinations of the acquirer’s and target’s employee-engagement scores such that we concentrate on four 
subsamples based on a two-by-two matrix capturing high/low scores by acquirers/targets, as shown in Table 
7 (the “Acquirer Low, Target Low” combination is omitted as it is the benchmark case). Likewise, we do this 
for all the four measures scores of employee-engagement: Employment Quality (Model (1)), Health & Safety 
(Model (2)), Workforce Diversity (Model (3)), Training & Development (Model (4)), and for all of these scores in 
the same regression (Model (5)). Again, some interesting observations can be made. First, most of the 
significant results arise from Employment Quality (Models (1) and (5)), consistent with our results in Table 3. 
Second, the significance is mainly present in combinations when acquirer’s Employment Quality score is high 
(above the sample median), regardless of the target’s Employment Quality score. In other words, the target’s 
employee-engagement does not seem to matter much for the incentive effect and the attenuating effect of 
cross-border deals. Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution as they come from a relatively 
small subsample. 
[ Insert Table 7 about here ] 
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IV.7. Robustness and Alternative Explanations 
Our above analyses have established that a firm’s orientation towards employee interests has both 
positive and negative effects on the returns to shareholders and firm value around M&A deals as reflected in 
the market reactions around M&A announcements. These results are in line with our hypothesis that acquirer 
shareholders value their firm’s employee-engagement (in particular in terms of monetary incentives) to 
improve employees’ productivity and reduce resistance around takeovers, as is illustrated by the increase in 
CARs for firms with higher levels of employment quality, especially for domestic deals. However, in cross-
border deals, higher levels of employee-engagement reduce the CARs, as acquirer shareholders face 
uncertainties regarding the transfer and integration of such employee policies in a foreign target firm. To 
further check the robustness of our results and rule out alternative explanations, we conduct a battery of 
additional tests, which we discuss below. 
Instrumental Variable Approach 
Our analysis is based on a sample of M&A announcements, which are largely exogenous events relative 
to the degree of employee-engagement acquiring firms adopt (as shown in Table 4) and thus alleviate the 
concern regarding a reverse causality problem in the relationship between employee-engagement and 
announcement CARs. In addition, it seems unlikely that bidding firms adjust their level of employee-
engagement because they may do a takeover bid in the next year. To reduce a potential omitted variable bias, 
we have already used industry and year fixed effects and a large number of control variables in our 
specifications. However, to further account for any remaining endogeneity bias from unobservable omitted 
variables, we perform a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) regression as a robustness test. Specifically, we 
use the acquirer’s industry peers’ average employee wages and benefits as an IV for Employment Quality. 
Whereas a firm’s expenses in terms of wages and benefits are influenced by the wage expenses by its industry 
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peers (satisfying the relevance requirement of instrumental variables), it is unlikely that these expenses by 
industry peers affect the firm’s announcement returns directly or through channels other than the focal firm’s 
employment policies, thus satisfying the exclusion condition. Similar arguments on peer effects are made for 
other corporate policies such as capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014), corporate financial policies 
(Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2016), corporate social responsibility (Cao, Liang, and Zhan, 2016; Liang and 
Renneboog, 2016), and corporate culture (Fiordelisi, Li, Stentella-Lopes, and Ricci, 2016). We take the within-
sample mean of the lagged employee salaries and benefits expenses (as obtained from Worldscope) for the 
focal company’s peer firms by industry and by year (industry-year average) as the IV. The results for the first- 
and second-stage regressions are presented in Models (1) and (2) of Table 8. Model (1) indicates that the 
industry peers’ average wage expenses are strongly positively related to Employment Quality, our measure of 
employee-engagement. We find in Model (2) that using an IV approach does not affect our conclusions from 
Table 3: strong employee-engagement (as predicted from the first stage) is still positively related to shareholder 
returns in domestic deals, and the effect again turns negative in cross-border deals. This increases our 
confidence that the effects on shareholder value we have identified are indeed driven by the acquirer’s level 
of employee-engagement.  
[ Insert Table 8 about here ] 
The Role of Labor Regulations  
The majority of the literature on the role of employees in corporate governance focuses on country-level 
labor regulations, which is why we have controlled in all of the above analyses for both acquirer and target 
country labor regulations. We revisit this issue here in detail. In particular, one could argue that the negative 
coefficient on employment quality in cross-border deals simply reflects the rigidity of labor regulations in the 
target country or “regulatory arbitrage” whereby firms acquire targets in countries with lower levels of labor 
regulation so as to avoid stricter regulations at home or, alternatively, bond themselves to stronger regulations 
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abroad to signal their commitment to employee welfare. We therefore explore how an acquiring firm’s choices 
in terms of employee-engagement, captured by our Employment Quality variable, interact with differences in 
state-imposed labor regulations between its home country and the target’s country. If the strength of labor 
regulation at the country-level does shape the firm-level employee-engagement, we expect the interaction 
terms to be significant. To do so, we regress the acquirer’s 3-day CARs on the interaction between Employment 
Quality and the difference between the acquirer country’s and the target country’s labor regulation indices 
developed by Botero et al. (2004). In Table 9, we find that none of the interaction terms is significant, 
suggesting that the cross-country differences in labor regulation do not explain the negative returns to 
shareholders of firms with strong employee-engagement in cross-border deals. Overall, acquirer and target 
countries’ labor regulations do not seem to either strengthen or attenuate the effects of firm-level employee-
engagement. 
[ Insert Table 9 about here ] 
Another alternative explanation for our main findings is that our cross-border results are driven by the 
fact that firms acquiring targets in countries with stronger labor regulations face higher restructuring and 
integration costs due to the rigidity of laws (Levine et al., 2015). That is, the negative coefficient of firm-level 
Employment Quality could possibly capture the direct effect of (target) country-level labor regulations. However, 
this is not likely the case because we already control for acquirer and target country labor regulation indices in 
all regressions. To better understand the relative importance of imposed regulations and of the firm’s choice 
of employment policies, we regress the acquirer’s three-day CARs on the separate acquirer’s and target’s 
country-level labor regulation indices (not taking differences as in Table 9). In unreported results, we find that 
only the target and acquirer country’s employment law indices are significant determinants of acquirer CARs. 
After adding our firm-level Employment Quality variable, we find that the country-level labor regulations 
coefficients remain significant, and that firm-level Employment Quality also remains highly significant. This 
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indicates that our previous results on firm-level Employment Quality are not explained by country-level labor 
regulations. Although others have documented that labor market regulations and ownership structure are 
substitutive governance mechanisms (e.g., Bennedsen, Huang, Wagner, and Zeume, 2015), we show that this 
may not be the case for corporate labor-orientation; firm- and country-level measures of employee policies 
capture different aspects and cannot be used as substitutes.    
Other Alternative Explanations 
In Table 10, we further conduct several more tests to rule out other alternative explanations for our 
results, especially with regard to the attenuating effect of cross-border deals. First, the attenuating effect may 
be driven by a greater geographical distance between acquirer and target countries thus the unfamiliarity of 
the different parties with regard to e.g. the quality of the human capital and the ease with which employment 
policies can be harmonized. We therefore interact the Employment Quality score with an indicator of whether 
the geographical distance between the acquirer and target countries are above the sample median (Model (1)). 
Second, many have documented that the acquirer and target countries sharing a common language or a 
common border may explain the propensity and returns of cross-border deals. We therefore interact the 
Employment Quality score with indicator variables capturing whether the acquirer and target countries have a 
language in common (Model (2)), or a share a common border (Model (3)). Third, our results may also be 
driven by a difference in GDP per capita between the acquirer’s and the target’s countries. That is, if acquirers 
with high employee-engagement could be firms from high GDP per capita countries that acquire targets in 
low GDP per capita countries, and it could be this difference in economic development that drives the 
negative announcement returns around cross-border deals. We therefore interact the Employment Quality score 
with the difference between two countries’ GDP per capita (in logarithm) (Model (4)). Fourth, the level of 
employee-engagement may be driven by the difference between the cultures of the target’s and the acquirer’s 
countries (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2015). Hence, in Models (5) and (6), we interact Employment Quality 
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score with two World Value Survey variables capturing the difference between the acquirer and target 
countries in terms of people’s attitudes towards work and are measured by the percentage of people 
considering “Responsibility Is Important” and “Job Security Is Important.” None of the above interactions have 
significant coefficients. For the cultural explanation, interacting with the widely-used Hofstede cultural 
variables gives similar insignificant results (results not reported). 
Inalienability or Over-engagement? 
The above analyses rule out several alternative explanations of our results with regard to the negative 
effect of employment quality in cross-border takeovers. What remains unclear is whether this negative effect 
is due to the fact that the inalienability of human capital and employment policies reduces shareholder gains 
from employee-engagement in cross-border deals, as we have hypothesized, or results from over-engaging in 
employee issues, which could then reduce firm value. The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 2 indicate 
that these two effects may coincide, and we need to disentangle them to further pin down the exact mechanism. 
Therefore, we regress announcement CARs on a dummy indicating whether the acquirer’s Employment Quality 
score is above the score of 50 (which we consider as “over-engagement” in employees) along with other 
controls as in the previous specifications, but on the subsample of domestic deals only. If the over-engagement 
story holds, we expect a significant and negative coefficient of the “High Employment Quality” dummy in this 
subsample of domestic deals. The positive coefficient in Model (7) refutes this, and suggests that the negative 
effect of employee-engagement in cross-border deals arises from the inalienability nature of human capital, 
rather than from the acquirer over-engaging in employee issues in general. 
[ Insert Table 10 about here ] 
IV.8. Employee-Engagement and Post-Merger Performance 
Finally, we investigate the effects of employee-engagement on the acquirer’s long-run performance after 
an M&A deal, that is, whether the announcement returns may contain information about the deal’s future 
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performance. Therefore, following our results on announcement CARs, we focus on the acquirer’s Employment 
Quality scores and measure long-run performance using the acquirer’s returns on assets (ROA) two years after 
the completion of the takeover. We follow the approach in Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012), 
and include the acquirer’s industry-adjusted pre-merger ROA in the model as a control.  Table 11 indicates 
that having a higher Employment Quality score increases the average post-merger industry-adjusted ROA in 
domestic deals, whereas it decreases the post-merger profitability in cross-border deals. These effects translate 
into an increase in post-merger ROA of 0.41% for a one standard-deviation increase in Employment Quality in 
domestic deals. Although cross-border deals on average show an increase in post-merger ROA, having a one 
standard-deviation higher level of Employment Quality in such deals decreases the post-merger profitability by 
0.30%. We find similar but weaker results for the post-merger industry-adjusted return on sales (ROS) in 
Model (2). This again confirms the hypothesis that uncertainties regarding the transfer and integration of 
employee policies in foreign targets can have a material impact on firm profitability and shareholder value, 
and that they are priced in by forward-looking stock markets at the takeover announcement.  
[ Insert Table 11 about here ] 
IV. Conclusion 
The importance of human capital in modern corporations has been widely discussed and scholars and 
practitioners largely agree that corporate engagement in employee-related issues has considerable 
consequences for both management and shareholders. In spite of the voluminous literature on this topic, how 
corporate employee-engagement really matters remains inconclusive. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) often 
put substantial pressure on a firm’s relation with its employees, providing a setting in which the firm-labor 
dynamics are particularly prominent. In this paper, we investigate the effect of an acquiring firm’s engagement 
in employee welfare on the returns to shareholders around M&A announcements for a sample of large public 
corporations around the world. We find that acquirers engaging in cross-border deals have on average more 
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generous employment policies at the firm level, and their deals also earn higher announcement returns 
compared to domestic acquirers. In addition, among the various aspects of corporate employee-engagement 
policies, employment quality in terms of monetary benefits (but not job security) affects shareholder returns 
around takeover transaction announcements, but this is not the case for employment policies related to 
training and development, health and safety, or workforce diversity. Acquirers with higher levels of 
employment quality (especially in terms of monetary compensation) earn substantially higher returns around 
the takeover announcement, although this does not extend to cross-border acquisitions. While cross-border 
acquisitions trigger higher abnormal returns than domestic takeovers, the bidding firm’s commitment to 
strong employee-orientation attenuates the abnormal returns in cross-border deals which appears to reflect 
the greater uncertainties with regard to employee integration and consistency of employment policies, which 
we call the inalienability of human capital and employment policies. The underlying idea is that since 
employees and their human capital cannot be easily separated, the acquiring firm cannot easily change the 
explicit and implicit contracts, such as compensation contracts and policies, to align acquirer’s and target’s 
employment policies so to properly incentivize employees in both firms and unleash their combined human 
capital. All these results are conditional on controlling for acquirer and target country labor regulations in 
terms of employment laws, collective relations laws, social security, and civil rights. However, the inclusion of 
country-level labor regulation indices does not erode the significance of our firm-specific employment quality 
score. This suggests that government-imposed labor protection regulations are not perfect substitutes for 
policies on employee incentives that firms voluntarily adopt. Furthermore, our main findings stem from the 
employee-engagement of the acquirer, rather than of the target. We also explore several alternative 
explanations for the positive relation of employee-engagement in domestic takeovers and the negative one in 
cross-border deals, but do not find consistent evidence that (differences in) country-level labor regulations, 
economic development, culture, geographical distance between target and acquirer, or their main languages 
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drive our results. Finally, we find that our main conclusions on abnormal announcement returns also persist 
in the firm’s long-run operating performance after the merger.  
Taken together, our findings may provide an explanation for the conflicting findings in the existing 
literature on the role of labor orientation in driving firm and shareholder value and shed light on how various 
stakeholder groups exert an intertwined influence on corporate governance and firm behavior. Perhaps the 
most intuitive implication of our results is that firms and shareholders should not consider generous employee 
benefits as being absolutely good or bad for firm value. A trade-off exists between value-enhancing incentive 
effects and value-destroying “inalienability” effects of a firm’s focus on employee interests. Which effect 
dominates depends on the extent of employee-engagement, as well as uncertainties in the contracting and 
transaction environment. Overall, our findings reinforce that employees play a fundamental yet more nuanced 
role in a corporation, and highlight the importance of taking into account such nuances when studying the 
interplay between finance and labor, a topic that remains a fruitful area for future research. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - Acquirer 
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our study for domestic and cross-border deals. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the acquiring firms’ labor orientation 
measures. Panel B shows a set of deal-level variables, including the acquirer’s announcement returns. Panel C shows firm-level variables and Panels D and E show country-level labor 
regulation indices for the acquirer’s and target’s country, respectively. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. Difference 
Domestic Deals Cross-Border Deals  
Panel A: Labor Orientation Variables (Acquirer)   
Workforce Diversity Score 2,550 49.81 45.61 31.40 4.830 98.67 2,015 56.66 57.80 30.94 6.11 98.79 -6.84*** 
Employment Quality Score 2,550 49.31 47.92 29.91 2.950 98.45 2,015 58.64 64.75 30.40 2.88 98.57 -9.34*** 
Health and Safety Score 2,550 45.50 38.62 29.60 2.800 99.44 2,015 58.09 58.22 30.27 3 99.49 -12.59*** 
Training and Development Score 2,550 47.97 45.29 31.25 5.160 97.40 2,015 61.66 72.34 29.49 5.16 97.39 -13.69*** 
Bonus Plan (Dummy)  2,550 0.386 0 0.486 0 1 2,015 0.478 0 0.499 0 1 -0.09*** 
Fringe Benefits (Dummy) 2,550 0.436 0 0.495 0 1 2,015 0.442 0 0.496 0 1 -0.006 
Wage Ratio Empl./CEO 2,550 0.337 0.315 1.552 0.001 11.25 2,015 0.369 0.001 1.631 0.001 10.96 -0.03 
Net Employment Creation 2,550 0.035 0 0.339 -0.79 8.06 2,015 0.023 0 0.599 -0.65 25.61 0.01 
Trade Union Relations Policy 2,550 0.176 0 0.381 0 1 2,015 0.316 0 0.465 0 1 -0.14*** 
Job Security Policy 2,550 0.060 0 0.238 0 1 2,015 0.110 0 0.313 0 1 -0.05*** 
Panel B: Deal-level Variables   
Acquirer CARs 2,550 -0.246 -0.219 4.275 -12.13 13.42 2,015 0.159 0.028 4.027 -12.13 13.42 -0.41*** 
Public Target 2,550 0.193 0 0.395 0 1 2,015 0.147 0 0.354 0 1 0.07*** 
Diversifying Deal 2,550 0.485 0 0.500 0 1 2,015 0.398 0 0.490 0 1 0.09 
Hostile Deal 2,550 0.009 0 0.0946 0 1 2,015 0.012 0 0.111 0 1 -0.003 
All-Cash Financing Deal 2,550 0.411 0 0.492 0 1 2,015 0.369 0 0.483 0 1 0.04*** 
Multiple Bidders 2,550 0.033 0 0.177 0 1 2,015 0.041 0 0.199 0 1 -0.01 
Toehold Stake 2,550 0.154 0 0.361 0 1 2,015 0.106 0 0.308 0 1 0.05*** 
Relative Deal Size 2,550 0.169 0.032 0.007 0 3.28 2,015 0.159 0.021 0.604 0 20.07 0.01 
Panel C: Firm-level Variables    
Acquirer Leverage 2,550 0.443 0.406 0.257 -0.005 1.000 2,015 0.429 0.388 0.253 0.001 1.000 0.01* 
Acquirer ROA 2,550 0.110 0.0986 0.105 -0.972 2.209 2,015 0.127 0.118 0.093 -0.60 0.645 -0.02*** 
Serial Acquirer 2,550 0.217 0 0.412 0 1 2,015 0.300 0 0.458 0 1 -0.08*** 
Acquirer Size (USD Mil) 2,550 38,906 6,925 123,507 249.9 1,107,776 2,015 65,855 8,733 186,560 249.9 1,107,776 -35,010*** 
Panel D: Country-level Variables (Acquirer)   
Employment Laws Index 2,550 0.318 0.218 0.180 0.161 0.828 2,015 0.411 0.282 0.216 0.161 0.828 -0.09*** 
Collective Relations Laws Index 2,550 0.382 0.259 0.174 0.188 0.711 2,015 0.410 0.384 0.178 0.188 0.711 -0.03*** 
Social Security Laws Index 2,550 0.678 0.646 0.0868 0.177 0.873 2,015 0.702 0.692 0.092 0.177 0.873 -0.02*** 
Civil Rights Index 2,550 0.685 0.733 0.0997 0.233 0.850 2,015 0.660 0.733 0.119 0.233 0.850 0.02*** 
Panel E: Country-level Variables (Target) – Cross-Border Only    
Employment Laws Index       2,015 0.437 0.403 0.201 0.148 0.828  
Collective Relations Laws Index       2,015 0.400 0.378 0.155 0.188 0.711  
Social Security Laws Index       2,015 0.679 0.692 0.135 0.105 0.873  
Civil Rights Index       2,015 0.667 0.733 0.125 0.233 0.933  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics - Target 
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in our study for domestic and cross-border deals. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the target firms’ labor orientation 
measures. Panel B shows a set of deal-level variables, including the target’s announcement returns. Panel C shows firm-level variables and Panel D shows country-level labor regulation 
indices target’s country. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. Difference 
Domestic Deals Cross-Border Deals  
Panel A: Labor Orientation Variables (Acquirer)   
Workforce Diversity Score 202 52.98 50.00 30.17 8.260 97.35 160 58.63 58.43 28.12 10.21 97.94 -5.65* 
Employment Quality Score 202 54.42 59.34 29.83 3.520 97.78 160 62.36 70.76 28.79 3.330 97.81 -7.94** 
Health and Safety Score 202 48.89 44.13 28.87 10.23 98.99 160 59.65 59.77 28.60 10.57 98.84 -10.75*** 
Training and Development Score 202 55.01 63.28 30.98 5.200 96.58 160 60.28 73.57 30.45 5.190 96.45 -5.27 
Panel B: Deal-level Variables   
Target CARs 202 6.307 3.185 12.02 -41.00 53.12 160 7.386 2.491 12.54 -12.48 55.21 -1.08 
Weighted CARs 202 1.321 0.524 4.014 -5.140 12.15 160 1.166 0.541 3.729 -5.140 12.15 0.15 
Panel C: Firm-level Variables    
Target  ROA 202 0.301 0.0998 1.533 -6.680 10.63 160 0.299 0.110 1.426 -2.540 12.23 0.002 
Relative Deal Size 202 0.699 0.553 0.604 0.00237 3.278 160 0.461 0.301 0.604 0.001 4.930 0.24*** 
Target Size (USD Mil) 202 29,567 6,985 60,273 48.10 289,603 160 25,006 5,661 57,277 89.30 289,603 4,561 
Panel D: Country-level Variables (Target)    
Employment Laws Index 202 0.324 0.218 0.182 0.164 0.809 160 0.394 0.282 0.200 0.164 0.828 -0.07*** 
Collective Relations Laws Index 202 0.343 0.259 0.161 0.188 0.667 160 0.349 0.259 0.159 0.188 0.667 -0.006 
Social Security Laws Index 202 0.678 0.646 0.0677 0.400 0.873 160 0.704 0.692 0.0741 0.400 0.873 -0.03*** 
Civil Rights Index 202 0.685 0.733 0.0918 0.461 0.807 160 0.654 0.692 0.109 0.500 0.850 0.03*** 
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Table 3. Employee Orientation and Announcement CARs: Full Sample 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around an M&A 
announcement. The independent variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee relations scores in terms of (a combination 
of (Model (5)) employment quality (Model (1)), health and safety (Model (2)), workforce diversity (Model (3)), and training and 
development (Model (4)). All specifications include a set of deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-
cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets, and the relative deal size), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, 
and leverage), and acquirer and target country-level (labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each 
specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross-Border 1.178*** 0.537* 0.771*** 0.522* 1.013***  
(0.294) (0.279) (0.272) (0.299) (0.352) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 0.007**    0.008** 
 (0.003)    (0.003) 
Acquirer Employment Qualityt-1 × Cross-Border -0.013***    -0.016***  
(0.004)    (0.005) 
Acquirer Health & Safetyt-1  0.002   -0.0002 
  (0.003)   (0.004) 
Acquirer Health & Safetyt-1× Cross-Border  -0.002   0.002  
 (0.004)   (0.0051) 
Acquirer Workforce Diversity-1   0.004  0.004 
   (0.003)  (0.004) 
Acquirer Workforce Diversity-1× Cross-Border   -0.006  -0.005  
  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Acquirer Training & Developmentt-1    0.0002 -0.006 
    (0.003) (0.004) 
Acquirer Training & Developmentt-1× Cross-Border    -0.001 0.009  
   (0.004) (0.006) 
Serial Acquirer Dummy -0.055 -0.063 -0.062 -0.061 -0.048 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) 
Acquirer ROA t-1 0.787 0.793 0.778 0.827 0.818 
 (0.812) (0.818) (0.819) (0.819) (0.814) 
Acquirer Leverage t-1 -0.124 -0.102 -0.118 -0.104 -0.103 
 (0.421) (0.422) (0.421) (0.422) (0.421) 
Toehold Dummy -0.022 -0.013 -0.020 -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) 
Acquirer Size -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.003 -0.015 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) 
Multiple Bidders Dummy -0.592 -0.593 -0.596 -0.599 -0.592 
 (0.392) (0.392) (0.393) (0.393) (0.391) 
All Cash Financing Dummy 0.127 0.129 0.126 0.128 0.134 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) 
Hostile Deal Dummy 0.597 0.586 0.600 0.587 0.586 
 (0.678) (0.680) (0.681) (0.680) (0.679) 
Diversifying Deal Dummy 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.015 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
Public Target Dummy -0.260* -0.265* -0.272* -0.265* -0.262* 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) 
Relative Deal Size -0.191 -0.197 -0.195 -0.197 -0.184 
 (0.162) (0.160) (0.159) (0.161) (0.161) 
Constant -1.764 -1.392 -1.550 -1.396 -1.797 
 (1.315) (1.304) (1.317) (1.305) (1.322) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 4,565 
R-squared 0.037 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.038 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Acquirer Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Country Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Country Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Employee-Engagement and M&A Likelihood 
This table shows marginal effects for Heckman regressions showing the effect of a firm’s employee-engagement in terms of Employment 
Quality (Models 1 and 2), Health and Safety (Models 3 and 4), Workforce Diversity (Models 5 and 6), and Training and Development (Models 
7 and 8) on the likelihood of engaging in a domestic M&A deal versus a cross-border M&A deal (uneven models), conditional on engaging in 
an M&A deal in the first stage (even models). The second stage control variables include the firm’s lagged market-to-book ratio, country-level 
labor regulations, and year dummies, the first stage additionally controls for lagged firm size. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2nd Stage: Prob 
(C-B|M&A) 
1st Stage: 
Prob(M&A) 
2nd Stage: Prob 
(C-B|M&A) 
1st Stage: 
Prob(M&A) 
2nd Stage: Prob 
(C-B|M&A) 
1st Stage: 
Prob(M&A) 
2nd Stage: Prob 
(C-B|M&A) 
1st Stage: 
Prob(M&A) 
         
 Employment Qualityt-1 0.002 0.00005**       
 (2.730) (0.00002)       
Health & Safetyt-1   0.003 0.00005**     
   (2.041) (0.00002)     
Workforce Diversity-1     0.001 0.0001***   
     (101.7) (0.00002)   
Training & Developmentt-1       0.002 0.00008*** 
      (50.10) (0.00002) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.386 0.013 0.671 0.013 0.371 0.011 0.401 0.012 
 (583.8) (0.016) (529.1) (0.012) (14,635) (0.017) (11,633) (0.016) 
Acq. Country Employment 
Laws Index 
0.756 0.025*** 0.671 0.0256*** 0.806 0.026*** 0.724 0.023*** 
(1,136) (0.004) (436.8) (0.004) (33,021) (0.004) (20,962) (0.004) 
Acq. Country Collective 
Relations Laws Index 
-0.781 -0.0180*** -0.723 -0.019*** -0.815 -0.019*** -0.777 -0.019*** 
(1,334) (0.005) (536.1) (0.005) (28,050) (0.005) (22,979) (0.005) 
Acq. Country Social 
Security Laws Index 
0.395 0.004 0.411 0.004 0.378 0.002 0.410 0.005 
(786.6) (0.007) (356.1) (0.007) (7,955) (0.007) (12,550) (0.007) 
Acq. Country Civil Rights 
Index 
-0.278 -0.009 -0.191 -0.009 -0.302 -0.009 -0.277 -0.007 
(429.1) (0.005) (113.7) (0.005) (11,590) (0.005) (8,184) (0.005) 
EBITDA/Total assets  -0.028***  -0.028***  -0.0290***  -0.029*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Ln(firm size)  0.0003  0.0004  -0.0003  0.0002 
  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
Observations 31,618 31,618 31,618 31,618 31,618 31,618 31,618 31,618 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5. Unbundling Employee Incentives (Full Sample) 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around domestic 
and cross-border deal announcements. The main independent variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee quality 
dimensions in terms of monetary incentives (Panel A), and job security factors (Panel B), interacted with a cross-
border deal dummy. Monetary incentives consist of a bonus plan (Model 1a), fringe benefits (Model 2a), and the wage 
ratio of an average worker and the CEO  (Model 3a). Job security factors consist of an indicator for having a trade 
union relations policy in place (Model 1b), net employment creation, measured as employment growth in the previous 
year (Model 2b), and a dummy for whether the firm has a job security policy (Model 3b). Each specification includes 
a set of deal- (relative deal size, and dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, 
hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size,  and leverage), and country-level 
(acquirer country labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, 
acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
Panel A: Monetary Incentives 
(1a) (2a) (3a) 
Cross-Border 0.701*** 0.745*** 0.496*** 
 (0.190) (0.185) (0.139) 
Acquirer Bonus Plan Dummy t-1 0.360*   
 (0.196)   
Acquirer Bonus Plan Dummy t-1 × Cross-Border -0.566**   
 (0.261)   
Acquirer Fringe Benefits Dummy t-1  0.452** 
 
  (0.211) 
 
Acquirer Fringe Benefits Dummy t-1 × Cross-Border  -0.649**  
  (0.254)  
Acquirer Wage Ratio Employees/CEO t-1  
 
0.106** 
  
 
(0.048) 
Acquirer Wage Ratio Employees/CEO t-1 × Cross-Border   -0.118* 
   (0.072) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 
R-squared 0.036 0.037 0.024 
Deal, Firm, and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
  
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
Panel B: Job Security Factors 
(1b) (2b) (3b) 
Cross-Border 0.417** 0.433*** 0.464*** 
 (0.169) (0.144) (0.145) 
Acquirer Trade Union Relations Policy t-1 -0.158 
  
 (0.215) 
  
Acquirer Trade Union Relations Policy t-1 × Cross-Border 0.106   
 (0.282)   
Acquirer Net Employment Creation t-1 
 
-0.098 
 
 
 
(0.254) 
 
Acquirer Net Employment Creation t-1 × Cross-Border  0.186  
  (0.288)  
Acquirer Job Security Policy t-1 
  
-0.114 
 
  
(0.320) 
Acquirer Job Security Policy t-1 × Cross-Border   -0.258 
  (0.418) 
Observations 4,565 4,565 4,565 
R-squared 0.033 0.035 0.035 
Deal, Firm, and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Acquirer Employment Quality: Mechanisms (Cross-Border Deals) 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border deal announcements. 
The main independent variables are a dummy for whether the acquirer does a repeat acquisition in a particular country (Model 1), a dummy 
indicating whether the target country’s population considers “good pay” more important in a job than the acquirer’s country (Model 2), a 
dummy indicating whether the target country’s population considers “saving money” a more important child quality than the acquirer’s 
country (Model 3), a dummy indicating whether the target country has a main executive party that is not considered “nationalist”(Model 4), 
a dummy indicating whether the target’s and the acquirer’s country’s population have low confidence in unions (union strength) (Model 5), 
or a dummy indicating low-tech deals (both the acquirer and target are in low-tech industries) (Model 6), all interacted with employment 
quality. Each specification includes a set of deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile 
deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage), and country-level (acquirer and target country labor protection indices as 
in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects.  Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
(1) 
Repeat 
Acquirer 
(2) 
Importance of 
Good Pay 
(3) 
Importance of 
Savings 
(4) 
Economic 
Nationalism 
(5) 
Confidence in 
Unions 
(6) 
Low-Tech 
Deal 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
-0.011*** -0.008*** -0.032*** -0.043** -0.009*** -0.016*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.017) (0.003) (0.006) 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × Repeat 
Acquisition 
0.014*      
(0.008)      
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × (Target 
Country > Acq. Country “Good Pay is 
Important”) 
 0.027**     
 (0.013) 
 
  
 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × (Target 
Country > Acq. Country “Saving Money is 
Important”) 
  0.025**    
  
(0.012) 
  
 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × (Absence 
of Economic Nationalism in Target Country) 
   0.037**   
   (0.018)   
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × (Acquirer 
and Target Country Low Union Strength) 
    0.018**  
    (0.009)  
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × Low-Tech 
Deal 
     0.015** 
     (0.006) 
Repeat Acquisition 
-0.544      
(0.549)      
Target Country > Acq. Country “Good Pay is 
Important” 
 -2.722***     
 (1.005)     
Target Country > Acq. Country “Saving 
Money is Important” 
  0.172    
  (0.784)    
Absence of Economic Nationalism in Target 
Country 
   -1.713   
   (1.064)   
Acquirer and Target Country Low Union 
Strength 
    -1.184  
    (0.730)  
Low-Tech Deal 
     -0.794** 
     (0.366) 
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 
R-squared 0.061 0.036 0.066 0.034 0.034 0.033 
Acquirer Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7. Aligning the Target’s Employee-Engagement with Acquirer’s Employee-Engagement 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around an M&A 
announcement. The independent variables dummies for combinations of above- and below-median target and acquirer 
employee relations in terms of employment quality (model 1), health and safety (model 2), workforce diversity (model 3), and 
training and development (model 4), and all combined (model 5). All specifications include a set of deal- (dummies for serial 
acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and relative deal size), firm- 
(acquirer ROA, size, and leverage, and target ROA), and acquirer and target country-level (labor protection indices as in Botero 
et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects.  
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross-Border 0.879 -1.688 0.598 0.117 1.111  
(1.273) (1.231) (1.205) (1.195) (1.580) 
Low Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality -0.541    -0.623 
(1.041)    (1.080) 
Low Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality × 
Cross-Border 
0.270    0.840 
(1.590)    (1.596) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, Low Target Employment Quality 0.997    1.366 
(1.067)    (1.223) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, Low Target Employment Quality × 
Cross-Border 
-2.924*    -3.789** 
(1.567)    (1.653) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality 2.288**    2.357* 
(1.145)    (1.307) 
High Acq. Employment Quality, High Target Employment Quality × 
Cross-Border 
-3.376**    -3.266* 
(1.626)    (1.808) 
Low Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety  -0.384   -0.455 
 (1.098)   (1.296) 
Low Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety × Cross-
Border 
 1.536   2.802 
 (1.600)   (1.883) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, Low Target Health and Safety  -0.992   -1.215 
 (0.954)   (1.109) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, Low Target Health and Safety × Cross-
Border 
 1.643   3.837* 
 (1.595)   (1.981) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety  0.00713   -0.668 
 (1.216)   (1.449) 
High Acq. Health and Safety, High Target Health and Safety × Cross-
Border 
 0.703   2.890 
 (1.628)   (2.029) 
Low Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity   -0.547  -0.410 
  (1.157)  (1.337) 
Low Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity × Cross-Border   -0.981  -1.406 
  (1.725)  (1.849) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, Low Target WF Diversity   -0.254  -0.232 
  (1.260)  (1.433) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, Low Target WF Diversity × Cross-Border   -0.990  -1.260 
  (1.754)  (1.941) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity   0.386  0.267 
  (0.943)  (1.170) 
High Acq. WF Diversity, High Target WF Diversity × Cross-Border   -3.226**  -3.767** 
  (1.428)  (1.538) 
Low Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev.    0.260 0.401 
   (1.193) (1.355) 
Low Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev .× Cross-
Border 
   -1.416 -2.756 
   (1.861) (2.122) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., Low Target Training and Dev.    -0.449 -0.698 
   (1.087) (1.403) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., Low Target Training and Dev .× Cross-
Border 
   -0.998 -1.109 
   (1.716) (2.114) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev.    0.223 -0.365 
   (1.069) (1.330) 
High Acq. Training and Dev., High Target Training and Dev .× Cross-
Border 
   -1.360 -0.447 
   (1.392) (1.741) 
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 
R-squared 0.164 0.139 0.154 0.139 0.206 
Deal, Firm, and Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Industry, Target Industry, and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8. Robustness and Alternative Explanations: Instrumental Variable Approach 
This table shows results for a two-stage instrumental variable regression (IV-2SLS) where the dependent 
variable in the first stage (Model (1)) is the acquirer’s employment quality score and the independent variables 
are the industry-year average of the salaries and benefits expenses in the focal firm’s industry peers (IV), 
along with a cross-border deal dummy, their interaction, and a set of firm-, deal-, and country-level control 
variables. The dependent variable in the second stage (Model (2)) is the acquirer’s three-day CAR and the 
main independent variable is the acquirer’s instrumented pre-merger employment quality score, a cross-
border deal dummy, and their interaction, along with the same set of deal- (relative deal size, dummies for 
serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public 
targets, and relative deal size), firm- (acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level (labor protection indices 
as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target 
industry fixed effects. The underidentification test refers to the Anderson canonical correlation statistics. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
1st stage: DV = 
Employment Quality 
2nd stage: DV = 
CAR [-1, 1] 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 0.095** 
 (0.046) 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 × Cross-Border 
 -0.081** 
 (0.041) 
Ind-Yr Average Salaries & Benefits Expenses t-1  
1.942***  
(0.516)  
Ind-Yr Average Salaries & Benefits Expenses t-1 × Cross-
Border 
-1.039  
(0.717)  
Cross-Border 
15.39 4.866** 
(9.398) (2.363) 
Observations 4,511 4,511 
F-test 27.10 1.954 
Underidentification test (p-value) 0.004  
Deal-, Firm-, and Country-level Controls Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Acquirer Industry FE Yes Yes 
Target Industry FE Yes Yes 
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Table 9. Difference of Labor Regulations between Acquirer and Target Countries in Cross-Border Deals 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border deal 
announcements. The independent variables in are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee relations in terms of employment quality, 
and the difference between the acquirer and target country’s employment laws index (model 1), collective relations laws index 
(model 2), social security laws index (model 3), civil rights index (model 4), and their interactions with employment quality.  Each 
specification includes a set of deal- (relative deal size, dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed 
deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level (acquirer country 
labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target 
industry fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Acquirer Employment Quality 
-0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007** -0.005* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Difference Acquirer-Target Employment Laws Indices 
-0.387 
   
-0.061 
(0.829) 
   
(0.695) 
Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference Acquirer-Target 
Employment Laws Indices 
0.006 
   
-0.002 
(0.012) 
   
(0.010) 
Target Country Collective Relations Laws Index  
0.098 
  
-0.449 
 
(0.864) 
  
(0.792) 
Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference Acquirer-Target 
Collective Relations Laws Indices  
 0.003 
  
0.012 
 
(0.013) 
  
(0.012) 
Target Country Social Security Laws Index   
1.004 
 
0.694 
  
(1.260) 
 
(1.037) 
Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference Acquirer-Target Social 
Security Laws Indices 
  -0.019 
 
-0.020 
  
(0.019) 
 
(0.015) 
Target Country Civil Rights Index    
0.030 0.454 
   
(1.225) (1.001) 
Acquirer Employment Quality × Difference Acquirer-Target Civil 
Rights Indices 
   0.006 -0.001 
   
(0.018) (0.015) 
 
     
Observations 1,819 1,819 1,819 1,819 1,819 
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 
Deal and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10. Testing Alternative Explanations for the Attenuating Effect of the Cross-Border Dummy 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around cross-border (Models 1-
6) or cross-border and domestic (Model 7) deal announcements. The main independent variables are a dummy for whether the 
distance between the target’s and acquirer’s country is higher than the sample median (Model 1), whether the target’s and acquirer’s 
countries have a common language (Model 2) or a border (Model 3), the difference in log(GDP/Capita) between the target’s and 
acquirer’s country (Model 4), the difference in the percentage of the target’s and acquirer’s country’s population that considers 
“responsibility” important (Model 5), a dummy indicating whether the target’s country’s population considers “job security” more 
important in a job than the acquirer’s country’s population (Model 6), all interacted with employment quality. Model 7 reports the 
result of regressing acquirer CAR on a dummy variable indicating that the acquirer has high employment quality (defined as the 
Employment Quality score above 50) and without any interaction on the subsample of domestic deals only. Each specification 
includes a set of deal- (dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, relative deal 
size, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA, size, and leverage), and country-level (acquirer and target country labor protection 
indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed 
effects.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR [-1,+1] 
Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Cross-
Border 
Cross-
Border 
Cross-
Border 
Cross-
Border 
Cross-
Border 
Cross-
Border 
Domestic 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
-0.009** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.008** -0.007* -0.007**  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  
Distance > Median 
-0.265       
(0.422)       
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Distance > Median) 
0.004       
(0.006)       
Target and Acquirer Country Share Common 
Language 
 -0.299      
 (0.542)      
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target and Acquirer Country Share 
Common Language) 
 0.008      
 (0.008)      
Target and Acquirer Country Share Border 
  -0.148     
  (0.510)     
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target and Acquirer Country Share 
Border) 
  0.003     
  (0.007)     
Difference in log(GDP/Capita) 
   0.079    
   (0.198)    
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Difference in log(GDP/Capita)) 
   -0.002    
   (0.003)    
Target > Acquirer Country “Responsibility is 
Important” 
    -0.017   
    (0.016)   
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target > Acquirer Country 
“Responsibility is Important”) 
    0.0003   
    (0.0002)   
Target > Acquirer Country “Job Security is 
Important” 
     -0.090  
     (0.913)  
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
 × (Target > Acquirer Country “Job Security 
is Important”) 
     -0.001  
     (0.011)  
Acquirer High Employment Quality 
(Dummy) 
      0.401** 
      (0.182) 
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 1,735 1,432 2,015 2,550 
R-squared 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.036 0.044 0.032 0.036 
Deal, Firm, and Country-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer and Target Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 11. Long-Run Operating Performance 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variables are the acquirer’s average 2-year 
post-merger industry-adjusted ROA (defined as net income/assets) (Model 1) and the acquirer’s 2-
year post-merger industry-adjusted ROS (return on sales) (Model 2) following domestic and cross-
border deal announcements. The independent variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employment 
quality score and the acquirer’s pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA (Model 1), or the acquirer’s pre-
merger industry-adjusted return on sales (Model 2). Each specification includes a set of deal- (relative 
deal size, dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile 
deals, diversifying deals, and public targets), firm- (acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level 
(index for acquirer and target country labor regulations as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable:  
(1) 
2-Year Post-Merger 
Acquirer ROA  
(2) 
2-Year Post-Merger 
Acquirer ROS  
Acquirer Employment Quality  
0.014* 0.002 
(0.008) (0.001) 
Cross-Border 
1.736** 0.385 
(0.796) (0.270) 
Acquirer Employment Quality x Cross-Border 
-0.024** -0.004* 
(0.012) (0.002) 
Pre-Merger Acquirer ROA (industry-adjusted) 
0.069***  
(0.025)  
Pre-Merger Acquirer ROS (industry-adjusted) 
 0.526** 
 (0.259) 
Deal, Firm, and Country Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 1,113 2,478 
R-squared 0.094 0.010 
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Appendix A. Variable Descriptions 
Deal Characteristics 
Cross-Border 
A dummy equal to one if the deal is labelled as “Cross-Border” in SDC, and zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Public Target 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s public status is “Listed”, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Diversifying Deal 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer’s 2-digit SIC code is different from the target’s 2-digit SIC 
code, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Hostile Deal 
A dummy equal to one if the deal’s attitude is labelled as “Hostile” in SDC, and zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
All-Cash Financing 
A dummy equal to one if the deal is fully financed in cash, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Multiple Bidders 
A dummy equal to one if more than one bidding firm was involved in the deal, and zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Firm Characteristics 
Toehold 
A dummy equal to one if the acquiring firm had a toehold before the acquisition, and zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Relative Deal Size 
Value of the deal, divided by the market value of equity of the acquiring firm. Source: SDC 
Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
Acquirer Size Log of the acquirer’s total assets. Source: Datastream. 
Acquirer Leverage 
Book value of the acquirer’s total liabilities, divided by the market value of assets. Source: 
Datastream. 
Acquirer ROA Acquirer’s EBITDA, divided by the book value of assets. Source: Datastream. 
Serial Acquirer 
A dummy equal to one if the acquiring firm made more than 10 takeover announcements over 
the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
Country Labor Regulations 
Employment Laws 
Index 
Measures the protection of labor and employment laws, calculated as the average of (i) 
alternative employment contracts; (ii) cost of increasing hours worked; (iii) cost of firing 
workers; and (iv) dismissal procedures. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
Collective Relations 
Laws Index 
Measures the protection of collective relations laws, calculated as the average of (i) labor union 
power and (ii) collective disputes. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
Social Security Laws 
Index 
Measures social security benefits, based on measures of (i) old age, disability and death benefits; 
(ii) sickness and health benefits; and (iii) unemployment benefits. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
Civil Rights Index 
Measures the degree of protection of vulnerable groups against employment discrimination, 
based on measures of (i) labor discrimination on grounds of race is expressly prohibited by law, 
(ii) labor discrimination on grounds of gender is expressly prohibited by law, (iii) statutory 
duration of maternity leave with retention of 100% of earnings, (iv) minimum working age, and 
(v) mandatory minimum wage. Source: Botero et al. (2004). 
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Employee-Engagement 
Employment Quality 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-quality 
employment benefits and job conditions, such as distributing fair employment benefits, focusing 
on long-term employment growth and stability, avoiding lay-offs, and maintaining relations with 
trade unions. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger value indicating better employment 
relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Health and Safety 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards providing a healthy and 
safe workplace, concern for physical and mental health, well-being, and stress levels of all 
employees. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger value indicating better employment 
relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Workforce Diversity 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining diversity and 
equal opportunities in its workforce, such as promoting an effective work-life balance, a family-
friendly environment, and equal opportunities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, religion, or 
sexual orientation. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values indicating better 
employment relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Training and 
Development 
A score measuring the firm’s commitment and effectiveness towards providing training and 
development (education) for its workforce. The score ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values 
indicating better employee relations. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Bonus Plan Dummy 
A dummy indicator for whether the firm provides a bonus plan to at least the middle 
management level whether employees' compensation based on personal or company-wide 
targets. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Fringe Benefits 
Dummy 
A dummy indicator for whether the firm provides its employees with a pension fund, health 
care, or other insurances. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Wage Ratio 
Employees/CEO 
Ratio between an average worker’s salary and the CEO’s salary, measured as Average Salaries 
and Benefits/Highest Salary. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Net Employment 
Creation 
Growth in the firms’ employee base, measured as Number of Employees, scaled by last year’s 
Number of Employees, -1. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Trade Union 
Relations Policy 
A dummy indicator for whether the firm has a policy in place to ensure good relations with 
trade unions. Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Job Security Policy 
A dummy indicator whether the firm has a policy in place to maintain job security. Source: 
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG Database. 
Mechanisms 
Repeat Acquisition 
A dummy equal to one if the firm has acquired a firm in the target’s country in the past. It is 
equal to zero if the firm has not previously acquired any firms in the target’s country.  
Target Country > Acq. 
Country “Good Pay is 
Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “importance of good pay in a job”, aggregated at the country 
level. Source: World Value Survey. 
Target Country > Acq. 
Country “Saving 
Money is Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “saving money is an important child quality”, aggregated at 
the country level. Source: World Value Survey. 
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Absence of Economic 
Nationalism in Target 
Country 
A dummy equal to one if the target country’s government has a rightwing/liberal main executive 
party. It is equal to zero if it has a leftwing/nationalist main executive party. Source: Database of 
Political Institutions.  
Acquirer and Target 
Country Low Union 
Strength 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s and acquirer’s country are in the bottom tercile for the 
variable “confidence in unions”, aggregated at the country level. Source: World Value Survey. 
Ind-Yr Average 
Salaries & Benefits 
Expenses 
Firms’ annual expenses in terms of employee salaries and benefits, averaged annually by 
industry. Source: Worldscope. 
Distance > Median 
A dummy equal to one if the log distance between the acquirer’s and target’s capitals is above 
the sample median, and zero otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
Target and Acquirer 
Countries Share 
Common Language 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer’s and target’s country have an official language in 
common, and zero otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
Target and Acquirer 
Countries Share 
Common Border 
A dummy equal to one if the acquirer’s and target’s countries share a common border, and zero 
otherwise. Source: CEPII. 
Low-Tech Deal 
A dummy equal to one if the target and acquirer are in low-tech industries, as defined by SDC. 
Source: SDC. 
Difference in 
log(GDP/Capita) 
The difference in log(GDP/Capita) between the acquirer’s and target’s countries. Source: CEPII. 
Target Country > Acq. 
Country 
“Responsibility is 
Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “a feeling of responsibility is important”, aggregated at the 
country level. Source: World Value Survey. 
Target Country > Acq. 
Country “Job Security 
is Important” 
A dummy equal to one if the target’s country is in the top tercile and the acquirer’s country is in 
the bottom tercile for the variable “job security is important in a job”, aggregated at the country 
level. Source: World Value Survey. 
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Appendix B. Industry Distribution  
This table shows the sample distribution by acquirer industry and year for the domestic and cross-border deals in our sample. 
 Year  
Acquirer Industry (Fama-French 48) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Agriculture 0 0 2 1 3 0 3 4 6 7 2 0 28 
Food Products 2 0 3 7 6 7 5 16 16 16 11 6 95 
Candy & Soda 0 1 0 5 4 0 1 2 5 3 4 0 25 
Beer & Liquor 6 5 6 3 3 4 2 1 5 11 1 2 49 
Tobacco Products 1 1 0 0 3 1 4 0 1 1 0 1 13 
Recreation 2 1 2 3 7 7 6 0 2 2 4 0 36 
Entertainment 1 0 0 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 0 14 
Printing and Publishing 3 4 4 11 6 3 2 9 8 5 6 2 63 
Consumer Goods 0 1 4 3 4 5 2 16 9 13 6 4 67 
Apparel 0 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 14 
Healthcare 1 0 3 2 5 1 0 4 1 3 3 2 25 
Medical Equipment 9 4 11 13 8 12 8 10 11 13 12 5 116 
Pharmaceutical Products 6 4 8 19 18 15 21 20 22 14 16 8 171 
Chemicals 3 6 7 13 9 12 6 17 16 21 17 6 133 
Rubber and Plastic Products 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 3 2 1 2 13 
Textiles 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 12 
Construction Material 5 3 6 9 8 8 6 8 7 10 5 3 78 
Construction 3 2 7 9 19 5 12 9 8 5 11 4 94 
Steel Works Etc 4 2 9 8 9 10 11 15 14 8 4 8 102 
Fabricated Products 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Machinery 4 1 8 15 15 9 15 13 23 21 9 8 141 
Electrical Equipment 2 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 7 3 7 1 35 
Automobiles and Truck 1 3 2 4 8 7 3 3 7 3 5 3 49 
Aircraft 3 4 0 2 4 4 3 4 5 2 5 1 37 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 0 1 1 1 9 
Defense 2 0 1 1 2 5 1 2 0 0 1 2 17 
Precious Metals 0 0 3 3 2 6 25 18 22 16 10 2 107 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 0 0 4 5 8 11 15 17 19 15 7 4 105 
Coal 0 0 1 2 5 3 2 6 1 4 1 0 25 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 5 2 15 20 25 23 36 30 31 32 17 10 246 
Utilities 13 7 9 20 11 21 19 20 14 14 4 3 155 
Communication 8 6 28 24 18 18 30 19 24 18 23 13 229 
Personal Services 0 0 3 4 2 0 4 2 3 2 4 1 25 
Business Services 24 21 41 42 38 49 29 35 47 53 43 37 459 
Computers 1 5 6 6 11 5 11 11 11 14 12 2 95 
Electronic Equipment 11 10 13 23 22 13 19 17 13 23 11 11 186 
Measuring and Control Equipment 1 2 7 8 9 3 2 3 3 6 1 3 48 
Business Supplies 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 5 2 3 29 
Shipping Containers 3 2 1 3 3 0 1 0 2 3 1 1 20 
Transportation 4 4 12 12 8 13 10 15 5 8 9 4 104 
Wholesale 8 3 9 17 14 10 13 11 17 12 13 6 133 
Retail 1 1 4 19 15 22 14 15 27 22 18 14 172 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 2 5 6 6 3 4 2 0 7 2 3 3 43 
Banking 12 19 36 44 49 29 24 31 38 30 21 18 351 
Insurance 5 5 5 11 20 15 9 12 9 12 12 11 126 
Real Estate 1 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 8 3 4 5 49 
Trading 7 10 42 43 51 28 28 41 35 42 32 18 377 
Other 2 1 2 5 2 12 2 2 1 8 2 0 39 
Total 168 154 344 456 470 413 428 476 520 514 384 238 4,565 
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Appendix C: Sample Distribution by Acquirer Country 
This table shows the sample distribution by acquirer country for the 
domestic and cross-border deals in our sample. 
Acquirer Nation Freq. Percent Cumulative Percent 
Argentina 3 0.07 0.07 
Australia 172 3.77 3.83 
Austria 27 0.59 4.42 
Belgium 35 0.77 5.19 
Brazil 84 1.84 7.03 
Canada 289 6.33 13.36 
Chile 9 0.2 13.56 
China 61 1.34 14.9 
Colombia 10 0.22 15.12 
Czech Republic 1 0.02 15.14 
Denmark 26 0.57 15.71 
Finland 44 0.96 16.67 
France 237 5.19 21.86 
Germany 54 1.18 23.04 
Greece 26 0.57 23.61 
Hong Kong 16 0.35 23.96 
Hungary 4 0.09 24.05 
India 31 0.68 24.73 
Indonesia 10 0.22 24.95 
Ireland-Rep 28 0.61 25.56 
Israel 3 0.07 25.63 
Italy 116 2.54 28.17 
Japan 672 14.72 42.89 
Malaysia 21 0.46 43.35 
Mexico 17 0.37 43.72 
Morocco 1 0.02 43.75 
Netherlands 58 1.27 45.02 
New Zealand 3 0.07 45.08 
Nigeria 1 0.02 45.1 
Norway 54 1.18 46.29 
Peru 2 0.04 46.33 
Philippines 11 0.24 46.57 
Poland 26 0.57 47.14 
Portugal 16 0.35 47.49 
Russian Fed 51 1.12 48.61 
Singapore 37 0.81 49.42 
South Africa 49 1.07 50.49 
South Korea 86 1.88 52.38 
Spain 114 2.5 54.87 
Sweden 81 1.77 56.65 
Switzerland 112 2.45 59.1 
Taiwan 35 0.77 59.87 
Thailand 13 0.28 60.15 
Turkey 7 0.15 60.31 
Ukraine 6 0.13 60.44 
United Kingdom 593 12.99 73.43 
United States 1,213 26.57 100 
Total 4,565 100  
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Appendix D1: Employment Engagement by Acquirer Country 
Acquirer Country Employment Quality Training & Development Workforce Diversity Health & Safety 
Argentina 32.40 65.44 29.92 92.64 
Australia 41.04 38.83 53.87 54.18 
Austria 54.14 67.91 48.09 39.36 
Belgium 64.09 64.45 45.45 53.00 
Brazil 68.48 68.05 55.06 64.94 
Canada 39.25 34.02 37.64 47.46 
Chile 31.49 75.57 26.66 24.19 
China 51.34 44.01 25.96 32.45 
Colombia 46.97 70.07 37.78 60.28 
Czech Republic 69.88 77.75 57.75 28.70 
Denmark 57.55 51.28 47.34 55.14 
Finland 67.41 80.49 48.99 60.50 
France 75.68 80.27 75.15 70.69 
Germany 76.78 83.03 72.10 64.23 
Greece 68.97 71.89 47.03 49.24 
Hong Kong 59.87 52.90 29.53 32.32 
Hungary 89.23 78.68 90.59 91.11 
India 44.17 63.48 40.72 56.01 
Indonesia 77.85 82.32 20.98 48.08 
Ireland-Rep 48.92 54.77 36.26 60.90 
Israel 40.17 53.52 27.13 22.58 
Italy 65.19 67.30 55.06 54.92 
Japan 35.38 49.26 56.11 43.16 
Malaysia 43.12 60.08 32.29 40.76 
Mexico 48.90 39.07 43.33 41.41 
Morocco 61.42 91.92 15.37 13.76 
Netherlands 67.16 74.46 59.01 66.74 
New Zealand 69.24 45.92 46.72 51.77 
Nigeria 10.76 24.15 22.39 36.98 
Norway 71.62 68.91 78.47 68.48 
Peru 34.57 38.57 16.40 65.72 
Philippines 39.43 40.25 19.90 26.20 
Poland 37.32 40.67 15.15 25.93 
Portugal 71.44 68.41 38.12 54.58 
Russian Fed 65.62 66.16 26.20 52.46 
Singapore 34.12 61.59 30.50 43.31 
South Africa 60.13 69.84 63.02 80.66 
South Korea 50.96 57.32 44.88 45.92 
Spain 78.55 83.34 73.74 69.33 
Sweden 70.54 61.76 57.43 45.61 
Switzerland 68.12 74.26 61.16 68.41 
Taiwan 63.94 58.27 40.55 40.83 
Thailand 57.37 63.45 46.76 65.24 
Turkey 61.26 83.49 54.28 35.21 
Ukraine 6.80 21.58 10.50 26.18 
United Kingdom 64.47 64.34 58.79 62.57 
United States 48.68 39.29 49.64 41.38 
Total 53.43 54.01 52.84 51.06 
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Appendix D2: Employee-Engagement by Acquirer Industry 
Acquirer Country Employment Quality Training & Development Workforce Diversity Health & Safety 
Agriculture 39.11 63.68 33.83 62.72 
Food Products 48.97 52.89 47.29 51.36 
Candy & Soda 60.12 65.50 60.64 68.34 
Beer & Liquor 53.09 57.60 52.77 50.77 
Tobacco Products 56.56 72.32 67.90 75.18 
Recreation 67.06 75.77 82.93 84.33 
Entertainment 37.71 30.51 34.23 35.60 
Printing and Publishing 51.93 53.60 57.89 41.32 
Consumer Goods 67.16 63.90 65.03 67.29 
Apparel 38.03 32.93 35.95 35.08 
Healthcare 48.77 47.27 51.31 35.58 
Medical Equipment 54.73 57.28 55.68 48.56 
Pharmaceutical Products 54.55 50.76 58.70 58.86 
Chemicals 56.58 60.98 62.46 74.67 
Rubber and Plastic Products 46.17 52.71 52.82 47.38 
Textiles 29.16 46.58 58.71 55.80 
Construction Material 55.44 56.83 47.19 68.62 
Construction 54.29 62.87 50.09 57.95 
Steel Works Etc 56.20 60.69 47.43 64.61 
Fabricated Products 26.36 41.31 26.45 27.67 
Machinery 46.22 53.02 44.94 51.43 
Electrical Equipment 59.70 62.68 63.86 61.10 
Automobiles and Truck 55.20 71.49 61.77 69.38 
Aircraft 57.26 64.19 56.70 72.50 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 67.50 69.95 42.64 43.21 
Defense 57.35 52.76 57.65 61.29 
Precious Metals 37.69 38.26 34.76 52.93 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 53.33 52.22 46.36 69.27 
Coal 55.99 66.54 57.90 75.97 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 52.52 49.26 48.67 64.20 
Utilities 64.73 68.13 67.54 71.80 
Communication 58.40 56.55 58.28 49.74 
Personal Services 41.04 33.22 42.94 32.91 
Business Services 51.76 48.71 49.20 43.61 
Computers 46.65 50.94 49.90 43.67 
Electronic Equipment 49.55 49.72 49.89 47.72 
Measuring and Control Equipment 43.21 36.69 43.77 43.81 
Business Supplies 65.95 60.88 63.32 68.39 
Shipping Containers 50.28 65.73 57.95 60.30 
Transportation 50.88 49.45 44.31 46.04 
Wholesale 45.46 51.88 57.29 39.91 
Retail 44.58 51.38 50.45 36.88 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 67.89 59.72 59.75 43.18 
Banking 64.45 62.17 56.84 42.35 
Insurance 62.54 63.38 69.29 40.84 
Real Estate 45.27 47.99 51.50 38.91 
Trading 50.03 44.50 45.66 35.00 
Other 53.21 51.19 61.16 55.31 
Total 53.43 54.01 52.84 51.06 
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Appendix E. Employee-Engagement and Announcement CARs: Domestic versus Cross-Border Takeovers 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the acquirer’s three-day CAR around domestic (Models (1-(5)) and cross-border (Models (6)-(10)) deal 
announcements. The independent variables are the acquirer’s pre-merger employee relations scores in terms of employment quality , health and safety, workforce diversity, and employee 
training and development, and a set of deal- (relative deal size, dummies for serial acquirers, toeholds, multiple bidders, all-cash financed deals, hostile deals, diversifying deals, and public 
targets, and relative deal size), firm- (acquirer ROA and leverage), and country-level (acquirer country labor protection indices as in Botero et al. (2004)) control variables. Models (6) –
(10) additionally include target country labor protection indices. Each specification includes year, acquirer industry, and target industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Acquirer CAR  
[-1,+1] 
Domestic Deals  Cross-Border Deals  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Acquirer Employment Quality t-1 
0.008** 
  
 0.008** -0.009**    -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
  
 (0.004) (0.003)    (0.004) 
Acquirer Health & Safety t-1  
0.003 
 
 0.002  -0.002   -0.0003 
 (0.003) 
 
 (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.004) 
Acquirer Workforce Diversity t-1  
 
0.003  0.001   -0.0009  0.002 
 
 
(0.003)  (0.004)   (0.003)  (0.004) 
Acquirer Training and Development 
t-1 
   0.0009 -0.004    -0.002 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.004)    (0.004) (0.005) 
Serial Acquirer Dummy 
0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 0.021 -0.195 -0.191 -0.190 -0.184 -0.201 
(0.203) (0.202) (0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.212) (0.212) 
Acquirer ROA t-1 
2.296** 2.330** 2.368** 2.385** 2.313** -1.857 -2.083 -2.091 -2.053 -1.926 
(0.960) (0.964) (0.961) (0.965) (0.964) (1.342) (1.347) (1.348) (1.352) (1.344) 
Acquirer Leverage t-1 
-0.575 -0.595 -0.599 -0.596 -0.569 0.498 0.512 0.519 0.517 0.505 
(0.587) (0.588) (0.588) (0.588) (0.587) (0.629) (0.632) (0.632) (0.633) (0.629) 
Toehold Dummy 
-0.064 -0.052 -0.056 -0.054 -0.053 -0.039 -0.042 -0.041 -0.047 -0.036 
(0.231) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.282) 
Acquirer Size 
0.0006 0.036 0.032 0.051 0.009 -0.025 -0.072 -0.075 -0.070 -0.050 
(0.084) (0.0834) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.090) (0.092) (0.095) (0.093) (0.098) 
Multiple Bidders Dummy 
-0.611 -0.607 -0.617 -0.622 -0.604 -0.780 -0.786 -0.781 -0.781 -0.779 
(0.613) (0.615) (0.616) (0.615) (0.613) (0.481) (0.484) (0.484) (0.485) (0.481) 
All-Cash Financing Dummy 
0.159 0.151 0.151 0.152 0.161 0.160 0.162 0.163 0.161 0.157 
(0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.207) (0.208) 
Hostile Deal Dummy 
1.676** 1.641* 1.661** 1.656** 1.654** -0.762 -0.747 -0.749 -0.746 -0.757 
(0.825) (0.843) (0.846) (0.843) (0.822) (0.993) (0.995) (0.994) (0.991) (0.998) 
Diversifying Deal Dummy 
0.0352 0.0164 0.0245 0.0209 0.0348 -0.187 -0.173 -0.174 -0.177 -0.185 
(0.200) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200) (0.224) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.224) 
Public Target Dummy 
-0.609*** -0.619*** -0.624*** -0.616*** -0.607*** 0.145 0.151 0.150 0.148 0.148 
(0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) (0.228) 
Relative Deal Size 
-0.314 -0.320 -0.318 -0.325 -0.310 -0.158 -0.167 -0.166 -0.167 -0.157 
(0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.343) (0.175) (0.171) (0.171) (0.172) (0.175) 
Constant 0.345 0.179 0.217 0.198 0.269 -1.569 -1.384 -1.447 -1.393 -1.451 
 (2.353) (2.342) (2.343) (2.344) (2.351) (1.705) (1.697) (1.717) (1.702) (1.716) 
Observations 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,550 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 
R-squared 0.075 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.058 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.059 
Year, Acq. Ind. And Target Ind. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Country Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Country Level Controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
